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INTRODUCTION 
Many in the international law and foreign affairs communities are aware 
of an incident which occurred on March 8, 2009, in the South China Sea, 
involving the United States Naval Ship (“USNS”) Impeccable (T-AGOS-
23) and five vessels from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).  Only a 
small percentage of those communities, however, are familiar with the 
March 8th incident in substantial detail, both factually and legally.  
Although the incident was reported by the news media in the days and 
weeks following, such reporting was merely the “first rough draft of 
history.”1  Therefore, much like how a courtroom trial provides a 
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 1. See Philip Graham, Address to Newsweek Magazine Correspondents in London, 
England (April 1963) (“So let us today drudge on about our inescapably impossible task of 
providing every week a first rough draft of history that will never really be completed about a 
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community with an opportunity to step back and dispassionately examine an 
alleged crime or civil wrong with deliberate consideration, so too is there 
value in stepping back and reflecting upon this maritime incident in greater 
depth as its one-year anniversary has approached.  Effective reflection on 
the incident can occur only when detached observers have an opportunity to 
weigh the actual facts of that day, apply international law to those facts, and 
reach a well-considered legal judgment—in essence, a “verdict”—on the 
incident.  To reach such an informal verdict, these observers must be 
presented with detailed perspectives from the two nations involved.  The 
purpose of this Article is to provide such a detailed perspective from one of 
those nations—in this case, the United States. 
This discussion will focus upon the March 8th incident—which has 
come to be known in some circles as “the Impeccable incident.”  Thus, it 
will not discuss matters like the competing maritime claims between the 
PRC and its nation-state neighbors in the South China Sea region because 
those maritime claims are not directly implicated in the March 8th incident.  
It will also not discuss concepts like marine scientific research, 
hydrographic surveys, or military surveys because the U.S. ship was not 
conducting military survey operations, but rather routine military 
surveillance operations.2  It will also not discuss the legality of conducting 
military aerial surveillance outside a coastal state’s national airspace 
because this March 8th incident involved only surface vessels.3  
Additionally, because the March 8th incident involved only U.S. and PRC 
vessels, it will not discuss how government ships operated by other nations 
have recently experienced similar treatment by the PRC while they too 
  
world we can never really understand . . . .”).  Graham was the long-time publisher of the 
Washington Post newspaper.  He made this often-quoted observation in a early 1960s speech 
to an audience of Newsweek magazine correspondents in London, soon after his company 
acquired Newsweek.  
 2. See RAW DATA:  Pentagon Statement on Chinese Incident with U.S. Navy, FOX 
NEWS, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/09/raw-data-pentagon-
statement-chinese-incident-navy/ [hereinafter “Pentagon Statement”] (“[T]he U.S. ocean 
surveillance ship . . .”); see also U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command, USNS Impeccable, 
Ocean Surveillance Ship, http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=106 (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2010) (“USNS Impeccable is one of the five Ocean Surveillance Ships that 
are part of the 25 ships in Military Sealift Command’s Special Mission Ships Program.”). 
The function of these ocean surveillance ships is to use sonar arrays to detect and track 
undersea threats.  See  U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command, Special Mission Program, 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/PM2/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (“Five ocean surveillance ships 
directly support the Navy by using both passive and active low frequency sonar arrays to 
detect and track undersea threats.”). 
 3. For a summary of the facts of the incident between a U.S. Navy EP-3 and a 
People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”) F-8 which occurred on April 1, 2001, and the 
corresponding legal positions espoused by the two governments on the matter, see China-US 
Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001:  Assessments and Policy Implications, 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, RL30946, Oct. 10, 2001, 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf [hereinafter CRS Report 
RL30946]. 
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conducted lawful military activities beyond the territorial seas of the PRC.  
Many of these related subjects have already been previously discussed by 
U.S. Navy legal experts.4  In short, rather than discuss all things regarding 
exclusive economic zones (“EEZ”), this article will focus upon the specific 
“cause of action” at issue—that is, the incident which occurred on March 8, 
2009.    
This discussion is “a” perspective from the United States—vice “the” 
perspective of the United States—because the incident is discussed in the 
personal capacity of the Author.  With that being said, this discussion will 
attempt to focus upon and synthesize the official statements and comments 
issued by and physical documentation (i.e., video and photographs) released 
by the United States and PRC governments, to the extent possible.  This 
focus on official statements and information serves multiple purposes.  
First, it keeps the discussion at the unclassified level and thereby, available 
to the broadest possible audience.  Second, it also prevents the discussion 
from chasing down rhetorical rabbit holes and responding to every 
conceived legal argument posited by any outsider about the general subject 
of foreign military activities in an exclusive economic zone.  Instead, since 
the March 8th incident involved official government actions by the two 
nations’ governments, this discussion of the facts and the law will focus on 
the actions and intent of those two nation-state actors. 
Part I of this Article will focus on the facts of the March 8th incident.  
This will include a factual account of the incident, as provided by the U.S. 
government one day after the incident actually occurred.  Next, it will 
present the official public statements made by the PRC government about 
the incident.  Then, perhaps most importantly, the discussion of facts will 
identify objective evidence which might corroborate or refute the respective 
factual accounts.  Juxtaposing the two governments’ statements on the facts 
of the March 8th incident with this objective evidence will prove quite 
telling for which side’s account is closer to the truth. 
Part II of this Article will focus on the applicable law of the March 8th 
incident.  This legal discussion will examine two bodies of international 
law: first the international rules of navigational safety, and second, the 
international law of the sea.  Viewing the facts of the incident through the 
prism of these two distinct, but related bodies of international law will show 
which nation operated in accordance with its legal rights and 
responsibilities, and which nation disregarded international law in its 
actions. 
  
 4. See generally Capt. Raul Pedrozo, Close Encounters at Sea, 62 
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 101, 101–11 (2009); see also Cdr. James Kraska, Sovereignty at Sea, 
51 SURVIVAL 13 (June–July 2009).  For a legal discussion about marine scientific research 
and survey activities from the U.S. perspective, see Ashley Roach & Robert W. Smith, 
Excessive Maritime Claims, 66 INT’L L. STUD. U.S. NAVAL WAR COL. 247, 247–49 (1994). 
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Ultimately, this Article will reach several conclusions.  First, it will 
conclude that one of the nations involved was candid, clear, and consistent 
in its factual account of the March 8th incident and provided detailed 
corroboration to the international community; in stark contrast, the other 
nation was cryptic at best, and misleading at worst.  Second, it will conclude 
that the actions of one nation during the March 8th incident were wholly 
consistent with its rights and responsibilities afforded by applicable 
international law; meanwhile, the other nation demonstrated utter disregard 
for those same bodies of law.  Third, it will conclude that since neither the 
facts of the incident nor the applicable law support the actions and position 
of one of these nations—both in the specific incident of March 8, 2009 or in 
this dispute generally—that nation is attempting to unilaterally renegotiate 
an established body of international law right before the world’s very eyes.  
All of these conclusions should be extremely troubling to the community of 
nations. 
I. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED ON MARCH 8, 2009 
We now turn to the actual facts of the March 8th incident in the South 
China Sea.  While legal experts instinctively want to jump to debating the 
law, practicing attorneys also know that they must take their client “as is” 
and grapple with the facts of their case as they actually unfolded—vice as 
their counsel wished for them to have happened.  As an American colonial 
defense lawyer turned U.S. President once told a jury in the famous “Boston 
Massacre” prosecution of occupying British soldiers, “Facts are stubborn 
things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of 
our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.”5  Thus, before 
discussing the law, the facts and evidence of the March 8th incident should 
be examined. 
A. Stating the Facts of the Incident 
The incident occurred on Sunday, March 8, 2009,6 in an area of the 
ocean approximately seventy-five miles from the Chinese coastline.  The 
U.S. government was the first nation involved to officially comment on the 
  
 5. FREDERICK KIDDER, HISTORY OF THE BOSTON MASSACRE, MARCH 5, 1770 258 
(1870).  John Adams was the first Vice-President and second President of the United States 
of America.  However, prior to being elected to the Vice-Presidency in 1789 and the 
Presidency in 1796, he was a practicing attorney in colonial Boston and known as the 
American lawyer who agreed as a matter of principle to defend the British soldiers who were 
prosecuted for the Boston Massacre of March 5, 1770.  Ironically, the Impeccable incident of 
“stubborn facts” was merely three days after the 239th anniversary of the Boston Massacre. 
 6. Local date and time of the USNS Impeccable incident. 
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incident.7  On Monday, March 9—the day after the incident—American 
media outlets reported an official statement issued by the U.S. Department 
of Defense at the Pentagon.8  This official statement opened with a general 
remark about the incident: “On March 8, 2009, five Chinese vessels 
shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in dangerously close proximity to 
USNS Impeccable, in an apparent coordinated effort to harass the U.S. 
ocean surveillance ship while it was conducting routine operations in 
international waters.”9 
Thereafter, the official U.S. statement included more factual details of 
the incident: 
The Chinese vessels surrounded USNS Impeccable, two of them closing to 
within [fifty] feet, waving Chinese flags and telling Impeccable to leave 
the area. Because the vessels’ intentions were not known, Impeccable 
sprayed its fire hoses at one of the vessels in order to protect itself. The 
Chinese crewmembers disrobed to their underwear and continued closing 
to within [twenty-five] feet. 
USNS Impeccable’s master used bridge-to-bridge radio circuits to inform 
the Chinese ships in a friendly manner that it was leaving the area and 
requested a safe path to navigate. A short time later, two of the PRC 
vessels stopped directly ahead of USNS Impeccable, forcing Impeccable 
to conduct an emergency “all stop” in order to avoid collision. They 
dropped pieces of wood in the water directly in front of Impeccable’s path. 
The incident took place in international waters in the South China Sea, 
about [seventy-five] miles south of Hainan Island.10  
In addition, the official U.S. statement discussed other incidents which 
had occurred in the days preceding the incident: 
It was preceded by days of increasingly aggressive conduct by Chinese 
vessels: On March 4, a Chinese Bureau of Fisheries Patrol vessel used a 
high-intensity spotlight to illuminate the entire length of the ocean 
surveillance ship USNS Victorious several times, including its bridge 
crew.  USNS Victorious was conducting lawful military operations in the 
Yellow Sea, about 125 nautical miles from China’s coast. The Chinese 
ship then crossed Victorious’ bow at a range of about 1400 yards in 
  
 7. Due to time zone differences between Beijing and Washington coupled with the 
lack of a timestamp for press releases and news articles, it is not absolutely clear which 
nation first made official statements about the incident. 
 8. Pentagon Statement, supra note 2; Press Release, Jim Garamone, Armed Forces 
Press Service, Chinese Vessels Shadow, Harass Unarmed U.S. Surveillance Ship (Mar. 9, 
2009); Pentagon: Chinese Vessels Harassed Unarmed Ship, BREITBART, Mar. 9, 2009, 
available at http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D96QJ2S00&show_article=1. 
 9. Pentagon Statement, supra note 2. 
 10. Id. 
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darkness without notice or warning.  The following day, a Chinese Y-12 
maritime surveillance aircraft conducted 12 fly-bys of Victorious at an 
altitude of about 400 feet and a range of 500 yards. 
On March 5, without notice or warning, a Chinese frigate approached 
USNS Impeccable and proceeded to cross its bow at a range of 
approximately 100 yards.  This was followed less than two hours later by a 
Chinese Y-12 aircraft conducting 11 fly-bys of Impeccable at an altitude 
of 600 feet and a range from 100-300 feet.  The frigate then crossed 
Impeccable’s bow yet again, this time at a range of approximately 400-500 
yards without rendering courtesy or notice of her intentions. 
On March 7, a PRC intelligence collection ship (AGI) challenged USNS 
Impeccable over bridge-to-bridge radio, calling her operations illegal and 
directing Impeccable to leave the area or “suffer the consequences.”11   
Then, the official U.S. statement of March 9th identified the five Chinese 
vessels involved in the incident: “The Chinese ships involved in the March 
8 incident included a Chinese Navy intelligence collection ship (AGI), a 
Bureau of Maritime Fisheries Patrol Vessel, a State Oceanographic 
Administration patrol vessel, and two small Chinese-flagged trawlers.”12 
Lastly, the official U.S. statement of March 9, 2009 briefly discussed the 
law which applied to the vessels involved in this incident, both in terms of 
the international rules of navigation and safety as well as the international 
law of the sea.13  
In short, the official U.S. statement released on March 9, 2009 provides a 
good summary of the U.S. perspective of the incident.  As will become 
evident, however, the U.S. government effort to present its account of the 
incident did not end with the March 9, 2009 statement.  Instead, it continued 
with the release of more detailed information and corroborating evidence in 
the days that followed.  Before looking further at the official U.S. account 
of the incident, however, let us consider the PRC’s official statements about 
the facts of March 8th incident.   
B. China Denies the Facts of the Incident 
The PRC did not proactively issue an official statement about the 
incident, but rather addressed the matter reactively during a press 
conference two days later and following the official U.S. statements.  On 
March 10, 2009, Mr. Ma Zhaoxu, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson, held a regularly-scheduled press conference in Beijing, 
during which he answered media questions regarding issues of foreign 
  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. 
 13. See discussion infra Part II. 
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affairs, including questions about the March 8th incident.  Regarding the 
U.S. account of the facts, the following exchange occurred: 
[Reporter]: Can you comment on accusations from the U.S. that Chinese 
ships surrounded and harassed a U.S. [N]avy vessel in international 
waters?  The U.S. says the Chinese ships sailed dangerously close and 
threw debris in the path of the [N]avy ship.  
[Mr. Ma]: The claims by the U.S. are flatly inaccurate and unacceptable to 
China.14 
This exchange was followed by another, which reaffirmed the PRC’s 
blanket denial of the U.S. account of the facts: 
[Reporter]: Can I go back to the naval question again?  If this was an 
illegal act, why was it that vessels which weren’t part of the Chinese navy 
were used in the response to the U.S. ship?  Is it Chinese Government 
policy to send patrollers [sic] to deal with this kind of incursion[]?  
[Mr. Ma]: The U.S. assertion is flatly inaccurate and unacceptable to 
China.15  
Regarding how the PRC vessels behaved in the incident, Mr. Ma stated, “I 
can also tell you that China handles such issues in accordance with relevant 
laws and regulations.”16  This last statement was translated into English by 
Xinhua, the PRC’s official news agency, more emphatically:  “The Chinese 
government always handles such activities strictly in accordance with these 
laws and regulations.”17  Lest there be any confusion about the Chinese 
account of the March 8th incident, Mr. Ma closed his remarks with the 
reporters at the March 10th press conference by discussing the clarity of the 
facts-versus-fiction of the two nations’ official accounts of the EP-3 
incident in 2001 and the March 8th incident: 
[Reporter]: Can you characterize the nature of this dispute?  It took years 
to overcome the fictions [sic] between the two countries after the EP-3 
incident last time.  Is it something that will remain in the military sphere or 
will endanger the overall relationship?  
[Mr. Ma]: The facts of the EP-3 incident were clear.  I do not want to 
make more comments here again.  On the incident of Impeccable, the U.S. 
  
 14. Ma Zhaoxu, P.R.C. Foreign Ministry Regular Press Conference, Mar. 10, 2009, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t541713.htm. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. China Lodges Representation as U.S. Naval Ship Breaks Int’l, Chinese Laws, 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
03/11/content_10990180.htm (emphasis added). 
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Navy surveillance ship, this time, I have already made China’s view and 
position clearly.  I have nothing more to add.18  
Lending to the view that Mr. Ma was not merely arguing the law, but also 
denying the U.S. account of the facts of the March 8th incident, Xinhua 
translated Mr. Ma’s March 10th comments into English as “the U.S. claims 
are gravely in contravention of the facts and unacceptable to China.”19   
Not to be outdone by the PRC Foreign Ministry, the PRC Defense 
Ministry also disputed the U.S. account of the facts.  On March 11—three 
days after the incident and one day after the PRC Foreign Ministry’s press 
conference—Senior Colonel Huang Xueping, a PRC Defense Ministry 
spokesman, was asked by reporters to respond to official U.S. statements 
made by the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon about 
the March 8th incident.  His response to the factual account:  “China cannot 
accept the U.S. [sic] groundless accusations.”20  Senior Colonel Huang also 
went on to describe the behavior of the PRC vessels involved in the March 
8th incident as “normal activities of law enforcement.”  This latter statement 
by Senior Colonel Huang—as well as the statement by Mr. Ma that “China 
always handles such issues strictly in accordance with relevant laws and 
regulations”—appear unconvincing since two of the PRC vessels involved 
in the incident were neither PRC military nor law enforcement vessels, but 
rather PRC-flagged fishing trawlers. 
Nevertheless, the PRC government did not stop with its March 10th 
press conference in its blanket denial of the U.S. account of the facts.  On 
March 12—four days after the incident and two days after the first PRC 
denial of the facts—Mr. Ma held another regularly-scheduled press 
conference at the PRC Foreign Ministry, during which an additional 
question of fact about the incident was asked.  As indicated by the content 
of the question itself, the reporters at these PRC press conferences were 
growing quite unsatisfied with the minimal level of detail in the PRC’s 
factual account of the incident.  The following exchange occurred:   
[Reporter]: I want to get more description of what has happened in the 
South China Sea from the Chinese side.  The Pentagon has been very 
descriptive of what has been happening.  Can we get the same kind of 
description from the Chinese side as well, especially about the Chinese 
ships involved?  The Pentagon says there were three Chinese government 
ships and two Chinese flagged trawlers involved.  Were they police ships, 
naval ships or civilian ships?  
  
 18. Ma, supra note 14. 
 19. XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, supra note 17. 
 20. Defense Ministry Urges U.S. to Respect China’s Security Concern, XINHUA 
NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
03/11/content_10994295.htm. 
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[Mr. Ma]: I already elaborated on China’s position about this incident 
yesterday.21 
But we have seen that Mr. Ma’s “elaboration” on China’s position was 
merely the statement that “[t]he claims by the U.S. are flatly inaccurate and 
unacceptable to China.”  Thus, in light of repeated efforts by reporters to 
discuss the specific facts of the March 8th incident and to examine the U.S. 
account of those facts, the PRC government simply declined to elaborate, 
avoiding the issue altogether.  
Then, on March 24—sixteen days after the incident— the PRC Foreign 
Ministry held another regularly-scheduled press conference, during which 
discussion of the March 8th incident arose once again.  The following 
exchange occurred between a reporter and Mr. Qin Gang, another PRC 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson: 
[Reporter]: How is the situation in the South China Sea?  It seems that the 
Philippines have stopped clamoring for sovereignty over the Huangyan 
Island.  Besides, the Pentagon claims that China attacked the sonar system 
of the Impeccable first.  Now rumor has it that the US has sent another 
military vessel to the South China Sea.  Could you confirm?  Will China 
follow suit to send vessels to the waters?  
[Mr. Qin]: We have reiterated our principled stance on the South China 
Sea issue, and we hope relevant countries abide by the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and do more things conducive 
to peace and stability of the region.  Regarding your second question, the 
U.S. remarks are sheer lies.  We have stated our position at the beginning 
of the Impeccable incident, and the U.S. is well aware of that, so is the 
international community.  Now, the pressing task is the U.S. should take 
concrete measures to prevent a repeat of a similar incident.  The resolve of 
  
 21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Press Conference on March 12, 2009, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2510/t542166.htm (last visited April 9, 2010). 
The remainder of Mr. Ma’s response to the question focused not on the facts, but rather legal 
arguments.  In the interests of completeness, however, below is his full response to the 
question:  
I already elaborated on China’s position about this incident 
yesterday. The activities of the said [U.S.] ship in China’s exclusive 
economic zone without our permission have broken international 
laws as well as China’s laws and regulations. It is totally justified 
and reasonable for China to take actions to safeguard its rights in the 
sea waters under its jurisdiction in accordance with law. We request 
the [U.S.] side to adopt effective measures to prevent similar 
incidents from happening again. I would emphasize here that a stable 
and sound Sino-[U.S.] relationship is in the fundamental interests of 
the two countries and two peoples, hence conducive to peace, 
stability and development of the Asia-Pacific region. This demands 
the concerted efforts of both sides. 
 Id. 
420 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:3 
 
the Chinese government to safeguard territorial integrity and maritime 
rights and interests is resolute.22  
Once again, the PRC government was unwilling to discuss the applicable 
law surrounding the incident or even to stand by its previous blanket denial; 
moreover, this time, the PRC government took a dramatic step further out 
on the rhetoric limb on March 24, 2009, describing the U.S. factual account 
as “sheer lies.”  Of course, there is nothing diplomatic or vague about such 
an emphatic comment by the Chinese diplomatic spokesperson.   
C. United States Corroborates the Facts of the Incident 
Before discussing the facts of the March 8th incident further, it might be 
helpful to first consider the dilemma of two conflicting accounts of an 
event—and the most effective way to determine which account is, in fact, 
the truth.  To do so, let us return to the courtroom analogy presented at the 
outset of this Article.  A binary dilemma often arises in an adversarial 
system of justice, which requires the finder of fact (i.e., judge or jury) to 
effectively evaluate two sides of a story to find the truth in a given case.  
For example, in the litigation of sex-related crimes (e.g. rape, sexual assault, 
and pedophilia) and sex-related torts (e.g., sexual harassment in the 
workplace), a victim tells one account of events, the defendant tells another, 
and a jury of their fellow citizens is charged with deciding which account is 
truthful. 
In a classic “he said-she said” case, where both sides tell their version of 
events, the burden ordinarily falls upon the trial attorneys for both sides of 
the case to convince the members of the jury to believe their side’s account 
of the facts.  Proving one’s case often involves not merely putting your 
client on the stand to testify about their side of the story, but also 
corroborating that side of the story with objective evidence to the extent 
possible.  Such objective evidence can include the testimony of other 
eyewitnesses of the incident, as well as physical or documentary evidence.  
Because the defendant is usually aware of the evidence against him before 
the trial begins, it is rare to catch a defendant in a “gotcha” moment where 
his account of the facts is subsequently proven false with objective 
evidence.  On those rare occasions when a defendant’s statement is proven 
to be false by objective evidence, however, the trial judge may instruct the 
jury members that they are allowed to consider such false exculpatory 
statements23 as evidence of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt—under 
the theory that innocent people do not lie.   
  
 22. Qin Gang, P.R.C. Foreign Ministry Regular Press Release, Mar. 24, 2009, 
available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t553628.htm. 
 23. See Military Judges’ Benchbook, Pamphlet 27–9, Dep’t. of the Army (Apr. 1, 
2001).  False Exculpatory Statements  
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In a similar fashion, the international law and foreign affairs 
communities are called upon to consider two accounts of the March 8th 
incident.  On one side, there is one nation’s government providing specific 
factual details of what happened.  On the other side, there is another 
nation’s government rejecting that account as “sheer lies”—but refusing to 
provide a contending version of the facts.  Thus, the next logical question to 
consider becomes:  how should a neutral observer decide which side in the 
March 8th incident is accurately presenting the facts?   
Just like in a binary-type sexual harassment case, the reader should 
consider any objective evidence offered by either side of the dispute that 
might corroborate one side’s account over the other.  Moreover, a neutral 
observer also should consider any such corroborating evidence that comes 
to light after both sides have provided their initial “testimony” about the 
incident.  For the March 8th incident, such corroborating evidence exists—
and it corroborates the U.S. account of the facts.  The evidence further 
shows that the PRC was inaccurate in its description of the event. 
  
There has been evidence that after the offense(s) (was) (were) 
allegedly committed, the accused may have (made a false statement) 
(given a false explanation) (__________) about the alleged 
offense(s), specifically (that (he) (she) told an investigator that (he) 
(she) was at another place when the crime was committed) (that (his) 
(her) positive urinalysis test was caused by medication (he) (she) was 
taking at the time) (__________).  Conduct of an accused, including 
statements made and acts done upon being informed that a crime 
may have been committed or upon being confronted with a criminal 
charge, may be considered by you in light of other evidence in the 
case in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
If an accused voluntarily offers an explanation or makes some 
statement tending to establish (his) (her) innocence, and such 
explanation or statement is later shown to be false, you may consider 
whether this circumstantial evidence points to a consciousness of 
guilt. 
You may infer that an innocent person does not ordinarily find it 
necessary to invent or fabricate a voluntary explanation or statement 
tending to establish (his) (her) innocence. The drawing of this 
inference is not required. 
Whether the statement was made, was voluntary, or was false is for 
you to decide.  (You may also properly consider the circumstances 
under which the statement(s) (was) (were) given, such as whether 
they were given under oath, and the environment (such as (fear of 
law enforcement officers) (a desire to protect another) (a mistake) 
(__________)) under which (it was) (they were) given.) 
Whether evidence as to an accused’s voluntary explanation or 
statement points to a consciousness of guilt, and the significance, if 
any, to be attached to any such evidence, are matters for 
determination by you, the court members. 
Id.  
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On Friday, March 20, 2009, the United States released such “gotcha” 
evidence which corroborated its side of the events.24  That date marked 
twelve days after the March 8th incident and eleven days after the U.S. 
government provided a detailed factual account of the incident.  Perhaps 
more importantly, March 20, 2009, marked ten days after the PRC 
government described the U.S. account as “flatly inaccurate,” “gravely in 
contravention of the facts,” and “groundless accusations.”  It also marked 
ten days after the PRC government specifically declined a request by a 
Beijing reporter to provide a detailed account of the events. 
What exactly was the nature of the “gotcha” evidence provided by the 
United States which corroborated its account of the facts?  Specifically, the 
evidence included photos and videos made by USNS Impeccable 
crewmembers during the actual incident.  Rather than merely asking the 
international community to take the United States at its word, the United 
States released documentary evidence about the incident, which allowed 
third parties to evaluate the matter for themselves.  Of note, this 
documentary evidence was not kept close-hold by the U.S. government, but 
rather posted by the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Information on the publicly-
accessible U.S. Navy’s official website25 as well as on the heavily-trafficked 
youtube.com.26 
  
 24. Pentagon Video: “Chinese Aggression  . . . Details at 11”, CNN, Mar. 21, 2009, 
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/03/20/us.china.navy/index.html. 
 25. “A crewmember on a Chinese trawler uses a grapple hook in an apparent attempt 
to snag the towed acoustic array of the military Sealift Command ocean surveillance ship 
USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23),” (photograph), http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp? 
id=69479 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Grapple Hook];  “Two Chinese trawlers 
stop directly in front of the military Sealift Command ocean surveillance ship USNS 
Impeccable (T-AGOS-23), forcing the ship to conduct an emergency “all stop” in order to 
avoid collision,” (photograph), http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=69478  (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Chinese Trawlers]. 
 26. Youtube, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CHvwKk1576s&feature=channel_page (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010); Youtube, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #2, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0g56VL003FM&feature=channel_page (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010); Youtube, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #3, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pm2nYGp3dd4&feature=channel_page (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010); Youtube, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #4, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9IG9dEI44iE&feature=channel_page (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010); Youtube, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #5, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BlhjhDrChno&feature=channel_page (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010); Youtube, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #6, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLEC_f2_Fbg&feature=channel_page (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010);  Youtube, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #7,  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LILK3i0X0hM&feature=channel_page (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010); Youtube, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #8,  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SB5l-24Vbw&feature=channel_page (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010). 
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As a matter of substance, what does this smoking-gun, “gotcha” 
evidence corroborate?  The easiest way to demonstrate this corroboration is 
to set out some of the substantive facts asserted by the United States in 
official statements made in the days immediately after the March 8th 
incident, and cite photos or video frame-captures that confirm these asserted 
facts—all of which the reader can access on the internet.  Specifically, the 
following U.S. assertions of fact were corroborated as follows: 
U.S. Assertion of Fact #1:  “The Chinese ships involved in the March 
8[th] incident included a Chinese Navy intelligence collection ship 
(AGI), a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries Patrol Vessel, a State 
Oceanographic Administration patrol vessel, and two small Chinese-
flagged trawlers.”27   
Corroboration of U.S. Assertion of Fact #1:  “Raw Video #3”28 (at the 
0:14 mark) is one of the U.S.-released video clips which shows three of 
the five PRC ships involved in the March 8th incident.  “Raw Video 
#8”29 (at the 1:57 mark) is another of the U.S.-released video clips 
which shows the other two of the five PRC ships involved.  Together, 
these U.S.-released images corroborate that five Chinese ships were, in 
fact, involved in the March 8 incident. 
U.S. Assertion of Fact #2:  “USNS Impeccable’s master used bridge-to-
bridge radio circuits to inform the Chinese ships in a friendly manner 
that it was leaving the area and requested a safe path to navigate. A 
short time later, two of the PRC vessels stopped directly ahead of USNS 
Impeccable, forcing Impeccable to conduct an emergency ‘all stop’ in 
order to avoid collision.  They dropped pieces of wood in the water 
directly in front of Impeccable’s path.”30   
Corroboration of U.S. Assertion of Fact #2:  “Image 090308-N-0000X-
003.jpg”31 is a U.S.-released photo which corroborates that two of the 
PRC vessels, in fact, stopped directly ahead of USNS Impeccable and 
forced Impeccable to conduct an emergency ‘all stop’ in order to avoid 
collision. 
U.S. Assertion of Fact #3:  “The Chinese vessels surrounded USNS 
Impeccable, two of them closing to within [fifty] feet, waving Chinese 
flags and telling Impeccable to leave the area.”32   
  
 27. Pentagon Statement, supra note 2. 
 28. Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #3, supra note 26.  
 29. Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #8, supra note 26. 
 30. Pentagon Statement, supra note 2. 
 31. See Chinese Trawlers, supra note 25. 
 32. Pentagon Statement, supra note 2. 
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Corroboration of U.S. Assertion of Fact #3:  “Image 090308-N-0000X-
004.jpg”33 is a U.S.-released photo which corroborates that Chinese 
vessels, in fact, closed within fifty feet and that a crewmember, in fact, 
waved a Chinese flag. 
U.S. Assertion of Fact #4:  “Because the vessels’ intentions were not 
known, Impeccable sprayed its fire hoses at one of the vessels in order 
to protect itself.  The Chinese crewmembers disrobed to their underwear 
and continued closing to within [twenty-five] feet.”34 
Corroboration of U.S. Assertion of Fact #4:  “Raw Video #3”35 (at the 
0:48 mark) corroborates that a USNS Impeccable crewmember, in fact, 
manned the ship’s fire hose at one of the PRC vessels in order to protect 
itself. 
U.S. Assertion of Fact #5:  The Chinese crew members “used poles to 
try to snag the Impeccable’s acoustic equipment in the water.”36   
Corroboration of U.S. Assertion of Fact #5:  “Image 090308-N-0000X-
004.jpg” and  “Raw Video #3” (at the 2:10 mark) are U.S.-released 
images which corroborate that a crewmember of a Chinese vessel, in 
fact, used a pole to try to snag the Impeccable’s towed array.37 
In addition to corroborating these five material facts in the official U.S. 
statement released on March 9, 2009, the video released by the U.S. 
government on March 20, 2009 also demonstrated another fact of 
significant concern.  Specifically, “Raw Video #2”38 (in its entirety) and 
“Raw Video #3”39 (at the 1:01 mark) are U.S.-released videos which 
corroborate that one of the five PRC vessels followed USNS Impeccable 
and attempted to run over its towed array. 
This corroborating “evidence” of the U.S. account of the facts raises 
several questions for someone to answer from the PRC perspective:  why 
did the PRC government refuse to ever provide a detailed account of the 
facts of the March 8th incident?  When the PRC government spokesperson 
characterized the U.S. factual account as “sheer lies” on March 24, 2009, 
was the PRC government aware of the photos and videos of the incident that 
the U.S. government had released to the international community four days 
  
 33. See Grapple Hook, supra note 25. 
 34. Pentagon Statement, supra note 2. 
 35. Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #3, supra note 26. 
 36. Garamone, supra note 8. 
 37. Chinese Trawlers, supra note 25; Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - 
RAW VIDEO #3, supra note 26. 
 38. Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #2, supra note 26. 
 39. Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable - RAW VIDEO #3, supra note 26. 
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earlier on March 20, 2009?  Has the PRC government ever retracted its 
official statement that the U.S. account of the facts of the March 8 incident 
were “sheer lies”?  If not, why not?  In light of the corroborating evidence, 
does the PRC government hold firm to its other characterizations of the U.S. 
factual account as “flatly inaccurate,” “gravely in contravention of the 
facts,” and “groundless accusations”? 
Returning to the courtroom analogy, there is a process in many 
adversarial systems of justice in the world called discovery.  During the 
discovery process, the parties to a legal action gather and exchange 
potentially relevant evidence—be it documentary evidence, physical 
evidence, photographs, video, or other forms.40  As the purpose of the 
pleadings phase of litigation has shifted in recent years from narrowing the 
issues of fact to merely putting the opposing party on notice, one of the 
modern purposes of the robust discovery phase in civil litigation is to 
streamline the actual issues of fact in a legal dispute.  In reality, a secondary 
effect in this discovery process is also that a litigant compiling evidence in 
its possession often self-discovers what factual issues exist and, more 
importantly, which facts are irrefutable. 
For the March 8th incident, the PRC apparently experienced a similar 
narrowing of the factual issues—through “discovery” provided by the 
United States as well as through self-discovery.  On the one hand, the PRC 
was confronted with the above photographs and videos produced by the 
crew of the USNS Impeccable during the actual incident.  In addition, the 
PRC government likely examined the incident internally and gathered any 
relevant information produced by its personnel involved.  Other photos were 
found by the Author on the internet at websites not affiliated with the PRC 
government,41 but which are nonetheless images apparently produced by 
individuals aboard the PRC vessels involved in the March 8th incident.   
What do these PRC-generated images show?  In short, they corroborate 
material facts of the official U.S. account.  Specifically, they show that five 
PRC vessels were, in fact, involved in the incident.  They also show that 
these PRC vessels, in fact, surrounded the Impeccable.  Additionally, they 
show that one of the PRC vessels, in fact, crossed the bow of the 
Impeccable, closing within twenty-five feet.  Lastly, in case anyone planned 
to argue that the United States released “doctored” images of the incident, 
these PRC-generated images validate the integrity of the U.S.-released 
photos and video.  Despite the highly corroborative effect of these PRC-
  
 40. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.  
 41. Richard Weitz, Maritime Confrontation Highlights Troubled State of China-U.S. 
Defense Diplomacy, 9 CHINA BRIEF 9, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/ 
programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&cHash=0958acf22e; Latest 
Photos of Naval Dispute Between China and USA, http://sinodefence.blogspot.com/2009/ 
03/latest-photos-of-naval-dispute-between.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010); More Photos of 
Naval Dispute, http://sinodefence.blogspot.com/2009_03_01_archive.html (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010). 
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produced images, however, the PRC government apparently never posted 
these images on an official PRC government website or released them at a 
PRC government press conference.  One is only left to wonder why. 
Americans like to say, “a picture is worth a thousand words.”  The 
Chinese also have an ancient adage “Zhi Lu Wei Ma,” which translates in 
English to “point at a deer and call it a horse” and is understood to mean: 
saying one thing and doing another.42 These idioms are on poignant display 
in the aftermath of the Impeccable incident.  It is especially appropriate to 
consider the particular facts of the U.S. account of March 8th incident that 
were corroborated by the U.S.-released images showing a PRC 
crewmember attempting to hook the Impeccable’s towed array and of a 
PRC vessel attempting to run over the array.  Recall that on March 24, 
2009— three days after the US government released these photos and video 
to the world—the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson was asked about a 
detail of the U.S. account of the incident, specifically “the Pentagon claims 
that China attacked the sonar system of the Impeccable.”  Mr. Qin’s 
response:  “[T]he U.S. remarks are sheer lies.”  Taken together, all of the 
above images of the March 8th incident—both those generated and released 
by the U.S. government and those apparently generated by the PRC 
personnel involved in the incident—are worth a thousand words:  to show 
who was calling a deer a deer and who was calling it a horse.  Indeed, facts 
are stubborn things. 
II. WHICH NATION DISREGARDED INTERNATIONAL LAW ON MARCH 8, 
2009 
Let us now turn to the applicable bodies of international law.  The 
general subject of foreign military activities in a coastal state’s exclusive 
economic zone immediately engenders thoughts of the international law of 
the sea.  Before considering the March 8th incident in terms of that body of 
international law, however, we should not overlook another area of 
international law that also applies in a maritime context—specifically, the 
international rules of the road.  This body of international law ensures that 
nations operate their government-operated vessels safely and take measures 
to ensure that non-government vessels flying their respective flags also 
operate safely.  In the context of the March 8th incident and similar 
scenarios, both nations had a fundamental obligation to ensure that their 
mariners interacted safely with those of other nations—regardless of how 
the United States and the PRC view the strategic or national-level legal 
issues governing foreign military activities—beyond the territorial seas of 
coastal states.  Nations may disagree on all manner of boundaries and high 
  
 42. JAMES MCGREGOR, ONE BILLION CUSTOMERS: LESSONS FROM THE FRONT LINES 
OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 8 (2005); SITU TAN, BEST CHINESE IDIOMS 151 (1986). 
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politics; however, their mariners are nonetheless bound by the ancient code 
of “rules of the road” at sea, which have been codified in recent decades.  
A. Navigational Obligations Under the International Rules of the 
Road 
The USNS Impeccable acted consistent with international navigational 
safety rules and otherwise operated safely in relation to the five PRC vessels 
involved.43  On the other hand, the United States expressed substantial 
concern with the unsafe conduct of the five PRC vessels involved in the 
March 8th incident.  In the official statement issued on March 9, 2009, the 
U.S. government alleged the following: 
The unprofessional maneuvers by Chinese vessels violated the 
requirement under international law to operate with due regard for the 
rights and safety of other lawful users of the ocean.  We expect Chinese 
ships to act responsibly and refrain from provocative activities that could 
lead to miscalculation or a collision at sea, endangering vessels and the 
lives of U.S. and Chinese mariners.44 
Similarly, on March 19, 2009, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command 
highlighted the PRC’s violations of the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (“COLREGs”)45 in public remarks.  Commonly 
referred to by mariners of the world as the “rules of the road,” the 
COLREGs have the stated purpose of “[desiring] to maintain a high level of 
safety at sea.”46  In testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Admiral Timothy Keating stated, “The Impeccable incident is 
certainly a troubling indicator that China, particularly in the South China 
Sea, is behaving in an aggressive, troublesome manner and [is] not willing 
to abide by acceptable standards of behavior or ‘rules of the road.’”47 
1. Applicability of COLREGs 
Critics of U.S. military activities in the PRC’s EEZ occasionally point 
out that the United States is not a party to the U.N. Convention on the Law 
  
 43. The Author is unaware of any source—within the PRC government, PRC 
academic community, or elsewhere-—claiming otherwise. 
 44. Pentagon Statement, supra note 2. 
 45. International Maritime Organization, Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 
16, amended by Amendments to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea, Nov. 19, 1981, 35 U.S.T. 575, 1323 U.N.T.S. 353 [hereinafter COLREGs]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Press Release, Donna Miles, Armed Forces Press Service, More Work Needed in 
Military Relationship With China, Admiral Says (Mar. 19, 2009). 
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of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).48  Concurrently, these critics argue—either 
literally or rhetorically—that the United States therefore lacks standing to 
rely upon the convention’s legal regime.  Regardless of the merit of such 
arguments, the issue of standing to debate the COLREGs is different.  
Namely, it is undisputed that both the United States49 and the PRC50 are 
parties to the COLREGs.   
By the very terms of the treaty, the COLREGs clearly applied to the 
operations of the USNS Impeccable and the five PRC vessels operating in 
the PRC’s EEZ on March 8, 2009.  By the express language of the 
COLREGs, these international rules of navigational safety apply to all 
vessels operating on the high seas, as well as all vessels operating in all 
waters connected to the high seas.  COLREGs, Rule 1 (“Application”) 
states:  “Rules shall apply to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters 
connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.”51  While the 1972 
COLREGs predate the more detailed UNCLOS regime of maritime zones 
(i.e., territorial seas, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and high 
seas), the express reference to all navigable waters connected to the high 
seas clearly means that the COLREGs applied to the operations of the 
USNS Impeccable and the five PRC vessels operating in the PRC’s EEZ on 
March 8, 2009. 
2. Violations of Specific COLREGs 
The specific rules of international law contained therein establish clear 
responsibilities for how vessels safely operate in the vicinity of other 
vessels.  For the March 8th incident, however, the facts—as asserted by the 
United States and as corroborated by the photos and video previously 
discussed—show that the PRC vessels involved violated the following 
COLREGs.   
First, the PRC vessels violated Rule 8 of the COLREGs, entitled “Action 
to Avoid Collision.”52  Specifically, the PRC vessels failed to take “action to 
  
 48. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 94, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 49. COLREGs, supra note 45;see also International Maritime Organization, Status of 
Conventions, http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=693/status-x.xls (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 50. PRC is a party to the COLREGs.  See International Maritime Organization, 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=693/status-x.xls (last visited Mar. 26, 
2010). 
 51. COLREGS, supra note 45. 
 52. Id..  Rule 8 (“Action to Avoid Collision”) states: 
(a) Any action taken to avoid collision shall, if the circumstances of 
the case admit, be positive, made in ample time and with due regard 
to the observance of good seamanship. 
(b) Any alteration of course and/or speed to avoid collision shall, if 
the circumstances of the case admit, be large enough to be readily 
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avoid collision” or exercise “good seamanship.”  Moreover, several of the 
PRC vessels actually took actions which would easily have led to a 
collision, but for the impressive navigational skills of the Impeccable’s 
master and crew. 
Second, the PRC vessels violated Rule 13 of the COLREGs, entitled 
“Overtaking.”53  Specifically, the PRC vessel which pursued the Impeccable 
at close range and attempted to overrun the towed array failed to remain 
clear and keep out of the way of Impeccable, a vessel which the PRC vessel 
was, by definition, “coming upon” and in a position of “overtaking.”  Of 
note, regardless of whether the PRC vessel’s master intended to actually 
overtake the Impeccable, Rule 13 of the COLREGs makes it clear that he 
was required to assume he was overtaking the Impeccable and act in 
accordance with the rule’s requirements.  The towed array is a part of the 
vessel, no different than a towed fishing net is part of a fishing trawler.  
Since the COLREGs are focused on maintaining a high level of safety at 
sea, any vessel which overruns either type of towed equipment creates 
  
apparent to another vessel observing visually or by radar; a 
succession of small alterations of course and/or speed should be 
avoided. 
(c) If there is sufficient sea room, alteration of course alone may be 
the most effective action to avoid a close-quarters situation provided 
that it is made in good time, is substantial and does not result in 
another close-quarters situation. 
(d) Action taken to avoid collision with another vessel shall be such 
as to result in passing at a safe distance. The effectiveness of the 
action shall be carefully checked until the other vessel is finally past 
and clear. 
(e) If necessary to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the 
situation, a vessel shall slacken her speed or take all way off by 
stopping or reversing her means of propulsion.   
Id. 
 53. Id.  Rule 13 (“Overtaking”) states:  
(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules of Part B, 
Sections I and II any vessel overtaking any other shall keep out of 
the way of the vessel being overtaken. 
(b) A vessel shall be deemed to be overtaking when coming up with 
another vessel from a direction more than 22.5 degrees abaft her 
beam, that is, in such a position with reference to the vessel she is 
overtaking, that at night she would be able to see only the sternlight 
of that vessel but neither of her sidelights. 
(c) When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether she is overtaking 
another, she shall assume that this is the case and act accordingly. 
(d) Any subsequent alteration of the bearing between the two vessels 
shall not make the overtaking vessel a crossing vessel within the 
meaning of these Rules or relieve her of the duty of keeping clear of 
the overtaken vessel until she is finally past and clear.”   
Id. 
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serious risk of affecting the safety and potential seaworthiness of the vessel 
to which it is attached.   
Third, the PRC vessels violated Rule 15 of the COLREGs, entitled 
“Crossing Situation.”54  Specifically, two of the PRC vessels unilaterally 
created a risk of collision with the Impeccable by failing to “keep out of the 
way” and crossing its bow, even though the circumstances gave them ample 
opportunity to avoid doing so.  Once again, only but for the impressive 
navigational skills of the Impeccable’s master and crew, a collision did not 
occur with the two PRC vessels.  If a collision had occurred, there is no 
doubt that it would have been solely the responsibility of the PRC vessels 
for creating this risk of collision. 
Fourth, the PRC vessels violated Rule 16 of the COLREGs, entitled 
“Action by Give-way Vessel.”55  Specifically, despite the Impeccable 
initiating bridge-to-bridge communications to maintain a safe distance and 
avoid collision, the PRC vessels failed to “take early and substantial action” 
to keep well clear of the Impeccable. 
Fifth, the PRC vessels violated Rule 18 of the COLREGs, entitled 
“Responsibilities Between Vessels.”56  Specifically, the PRC vessels also 
  
 54. Id.  Rule 15 (“Crossing Situation”) states: 
“When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel 
which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the 
circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.”  Id. 
 55. COLREGs, supra note 45  Rule 16 (“Action by Give-way Vessel”) states: 
“Every vessel which is directed to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, so far as 
possible, take early and substantial action to keep well clear.”  Id. 
 56. Id.  Rule 18 (“Responsibilities Between Vessels”) states: 
Except where Rules 9, 10 and 13 otherwise require: 
(a) A power-driven vessel underway shall keep out of the way of:  
(i) a vessel not under command; 
 (ii) a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre; 
 (iii) a vessel engaged in fishing; 
(iv) a sailing vessel. 
(b) A sailing vessel underway shall keep out of the way of:  
(i) a vessel not under command; 
(ii) a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre; 
(iii) a vessel engaged in fishing. 
(c) A vessel engaged in fishing when underway shall, so far as 
possible, keep out of the way of:  
(i) a vessel not under command; 
(ii) a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre. 
(d)  (i) Any vessel other than a vessel not under command or a 
vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre shall, if the 
circumstances of the case admit, avoid impeding the safe passage of 
a vessel constrained by her draught, exhibiting the signals in Rule 28.  
(ii) A vessel constrained by her draught shall navigate with 
particular caution having full regard to her special condition. 
(e) A seaplane on the water shall, in general, keep well clear of all 
vessels and avoid impeding their navigation. In circumstances, 
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failed in its duty to “keep out of the way” of the Impeccable.  By 
definition,57 the Impeccable was a vessel with restricted-maneuver status 
under the COLREGs as it conducted its underwater surveillance operations 
and towed its array.  Meanwhile, the PRC vessels were “power-driven 
vessels.”  Consequently, in that type of situation, the vessels, which are not 
operating in a restricted-maneuver status, have a duty to keep out of the 
way.  In fact, the PRC vessels went a significant step beyond merely failing 
to keep out of the way—they actually put obstacles in its way by throwing 
pieces of wood into the water in front of the Impeccable. 
3. Breach of Duty as a Flag State 
In addition to identifying these specific COLREGs violated by the PRC 
vessels in the March 8th incident, it is also important to emphasize that the 
PRC government had legal responsibility for the actions of all five vessels 
involved in the March 8th incident.  Clearly, the PRC government is 
responsible for the unsafe conduct of the three government-operated vessels 
involved in the incident, but the PRC government’s responsibility did not 
end with the government-operated vessels.  Additionally, the PRC 
government was also legally responsible for the conduct of the two non-
government fishing trawlers involved in the incident.  As indicated by the 
photo and video images, these fishing trawlers were PRC-flagged ships.  As 
a flag state, the PRC government has an express duty under Article 94 of 
UNCLOS58 to take all necessary measures to ensure its flagged vessels 
  
however, where risk of collision exists, she shall comply with the 
Rules of this Part. 
Id. 
 57. Id.  Rule 3 (“General Definitions”), paragraph g, states:   
The term “vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre” means a 
vessel which from the nature of her work is restricted in her ability to 
manoeuvre as required by these Rules and is therefore unable to keep 
out of the way of another vessel.  The term ‘vessels restricted in their 
ability to manoeuvre’ shall include but not be limited to: 
(i) a vessel engaged in laying, servicing or picking up a navigation 
mark, submarine cable or pipeline; 
(ii) a vessel engaged in dredging, surveying or underwater 
operations; 
(iii) a vessel engaged in replenishment or transferring persons, 
provisions or cargo while underway; 
(iv) a vessel engaged in the launching or recovery of aircraft; 
(v) a vessel engaged in minesweeping operations; 
(vi) a vessel engaged in a towing operation such as severely restricts 
the towing vessel and her tow in their ability to deviate from their 
course.”   
Id. (emphasis added). 
 58. UNCLOS, supra note 48.  The United States is not a party to UNCLOS, but 
considers the navigation and overflight provisions therein reflective of customary 
international law.  See Ronald Reagan, President, Statement on United States Oceans Policy 
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maintain safety at sea with regard to the prevention of collisions.  This duty 
as a flag state includes the responsibility to take any steps which may be 
necessary to secure the observance of international regulations, like the 
COLREGs, by its PRC-flagged vessels.  Additionally, a flag state has an 
obligation to investigate alleged violations of the COLREGs by any of its 
flagged vessels, and if appropriate, to take any action necessary to remedy 
violations of the COLREGs by those flagged vessels. 
In the March 8th incident, the PRC government was put on notice of 
potential violations of the COLREGs by five of its flagged vessels, three of 
which were government-operated and two of which were not.  First, the 
official U.S. government’s statements and corroborating visual evidence put 
the PRC government on notice of these potential violations.  Second, the 
three on-scene PRC government vessels also directly observed these 
potential violations of the COLREGs by its non-government vessels.  
Despite this notice, there is unfortunately no indication that the PRC 
government either investigated or took any necessary measures to remedy 
the COLREG violations by the fishing trawlers.   
It appears that the PRC government-operated vessels were, at a 
minimum, abrogating their responsibilities as law enforcement vessels of 
ensuring PRC-flagged fishing trawlers operate safely in the waters of the 
world.  Worse yet, in light of their inaction and the unbelievable 
“coincidence” that all five PRC vessels happened to be in the vicinity of the 
Impeccable seventy-five miles off the PRC coast at the same time, it 
appears that the PRC government vessels were acting in coordination with 
the two non-government fishing trawlers, apparently employing them as 
their proxy.  Regardless, this inaction or coordinated action raises additional 
concerns about the assurances from PRC spokespersons about how the PRC 
vessels were following normal procedures.  Recall the PRC Defense 
Ministry spokesperson’s statements three days after the incident that the 
actions of the PRC vessels constituted, in his words, “normal activities of 
law enforcement.”  Additionally, remember that the PRC Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson stated, “I can also tell you that China always handles such 
issues strictly in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.”  
Employing non-government fishing trawlers as law enforcement proxies, 
however, surely does not qualify as “normal activities of law enforcement” 
in China or as “strict” compliance with the law. 
B. Navigational Freedoms under the Law of the Sea 
Next, consider the international law governing whether the Impeccable 
had the right to conduct routine surveillance operations beyond the 
territorial seas of the PRC, and whether the PRC as a coastal state had the 
  
(Mar. 10, 1983), available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/index.php?module=News&func= 
display&sid=101. 
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right to restrict the Impeccable’s operations in those waters.  As indicated 
earlier, the U.S. government stated its legal position early after the March 
8th incident regarding its right to conduct these operations beyond the 
territorial seas of the PRC.  In the official U.S. statement released on March 
9, 2009, the Pentagon stated, “U.S. Navy ships and aircraft routinely operate 
in international waters around the world, and this area is one such location 
where we operate regularly.”59  Additionally, the March 9th statement 
included, “[c]oastal states do not have a right under international law to 
regulate foreign military activities in the EEZ.”60  All subsequent official 
statements issued by U.S. government representatives concerning the law of 
the sea as it applied to the March 8th incident were consistent with this 
initial U.S. statement.61   
  
 59. Pentagon Statement, supra note 2.   
 60. Id.  
 61. A complete listing of statements on the U.S. legal position by U.S. government 
representatives in response to media questions are as follows:  For White House comments, 
see Robert Gibbs, White House Press Secretary, White House Press Briefing (Mar. 9, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/briefing-white-house-press-
secretary-robert-gibbs-3909.   
Q:   Mr. Gibbs, two questions. First, Chinese vessels have been 
harassing U.S. ships with increasing aggressiveness. I know that the 
Chinese defense attaché went to the Pentagon, or is at the Pentagon 
right now, to review a complaint, but is the President taking any 
other action regarding the Chinese government, to tell them to stop 
doing this?   
MR. GIBBS: I know that our embassy in both Beijing and here 
protested the actions of the Chinese ships that have been reported. 
Our ships obviously operate fairly regularly in international waters 
where these incidents took place. We’re going to continue to operate 
in those international waters, and we expect the Chinese to observe 
international law around them. 
Id. (emphasis added).  For U.S. Department of Defense comments, see Press Release, Geoff 
Morrell, U.S. Defense Department, Department of Defense News Briefing with Geoff 
Morrell from the Pentagon (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/ 
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4369. 
Q:  On China, Admiral Blair said yesterday this is the most serious—
the ship incident was the most serious incident since the Hainan 
Island incident. Does the Pentagon see it as a serious incident or just 
more of a minor irritation? And has the Navy taken any steps either 
to change their procedures or practices in that area or to provide 
additional protection for the ships involved?  
MR. MORRELL: I don’t know that I’m in a position to characterize 
it—serious, unserious, degrees of seriousness. It’s serious enough 
that we have reached out to our counterparts. And our Defense 
attaché in Beijing has been talking with the Ministry of 
Defense. These Chinese defense attaché here in Washington has been 
talking to the Pentagon. So it’s serious enough that we believe it 
requires face-to-face talks to find out what was going on here and to 
ensure that there are no further incidents of this nature in the 
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future. We believe firmly that what that naval ship was doing in those 
international waters is not only fully consistent with international 
law, it is common practice. And we hope that the Chinese would 
behave in a similar way, that is, according to international law. I 
would say that, furthermore, that this incident is not at all consistent 
with the expressed desire of both governments to build a closer 
relationship, particularly a closer military-to-military relationship. So 
at this point I think we remain hopeful that our face-to-face dialogue 
in Beijing and in Washington will go a long way to clearing up any 
misunderstandings that there may be about this incident and ensuring 
that there is not a repeat and that the productive military-to-military 
talks that took place, I think, last week will -- can be built upon in a 
positive manner going forward. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Press Release, Jim Garamone, Armed Forces Press Service, 
Discussions Aim to Resolve U.S. Survey Ship Incident (Mar. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53438 (“The U.S. position is that if a 
ship is lawfully operating in international waters ‘that is legal and permitted, and there 
should be no . . .  reason to interfere with those operations,’ [DoD spokesperson Geoff] 
Morrell said.”).  For U.S. Department of State comments, see Robert Wood, U.S. State 
Department Press Secretary, State Department Daily Press Briefing, Mar. 10, 2009, available 
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/03/120232.htm. 
MR. WOOD: I’m not aware of any further exchanges with the 
Chinese on this. They’re certainly well aware of our position. We 
were—it is our view that we were operating in international waters. 
I don’t have anything further for you on it, except just to refer to the 
Pentagon for more details. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Robert Wood, U.S. State Department Press Secretary, U.S. 
State Department Daily Press Briefing, Mar. 12, 2009, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/03/120300.htm.  
QUESTION: On China, today the Chinese Defense Ministry 
demanded that the U.S. Navy end surveillance missions. Do you 
have a general reaction to that? 
MR. WOOD: I haven’t seen the statement, but, you know, the United 
States will continue to operate in international waters as it has been 
doing. And I don’t have anything beyond that. . . . 
QUESTION: But the obvious follow-up to that is if there is this 
disagreement that appears to be about that international waters and 
whether the U.S. should be allowed to operate there, then clearly, 
you haven’t reached an agreement. 
MR. WOOD: Well, again, I haven’t seen these remarks, so I don’t 
know what the context is here. But let me just say that the United 
States, with regard to this particular incident, was clearly operating 
in international waters. We were respecting international law. We 
will continue to do that. And as I said, the Secretary and Foreign 
Minister Yang spoke about this issue, and both agreed that they 
wanted to – we wanted to create – we wanted to make sure that these 
types of incidents don’t recur. They’re not helpful to trying to carry 
on the positive agenda that we have in our bilateral relationship. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks After Her 
Meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Mar. 11, 2009, available at  
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/03/120284.htm.  
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On the other hand, also consider the legal arguments made by the PRC 
government in its official statements.  During the previously-mentioned 
March 10th press conference, Mr. Ma made the following declarative 
statement:  “Engaging in activities in China’s exclusive economic zone in 
the South China Sea without China’s permission, [U.S.] navy surveillance 
ship Impeccable broke relevant international law as well as Chinese laws 
and regulations.”62  The Beijing reporters present at the March 10th press 
conference, however, immediately realized that this statement was purely 
conclusory in nature.  Thus, a follow-up question was asked that requested 
specificity: 
[Reporter]: Can you clearly explain which article of the international law 
that the [U.S.] ship broke and which specific act of the US ship broke the 
international law?  
[Mr. Ma]: It seems that you are very interested in this issue.  I think 
China’s position is already very clear, and I responded to the [U.S.] 
stories. I can also tell you that China handles such issues in accordance 
with relevant laws and regulations.  I have nothing more to add.63  
Much like its non-discussion of the facts of the March 8th incident,64 
however, the PRC spokesman’s non-discussion of the law was also evident.  
That is, his statements avoided specificity at the outset, and when 
questioned thereafter, he referred back to the previous statements of non-
specificity.  The reporters present still were not buying this superficial 
response on the law, as indicated by a second follow-up question requesting 
specificity: 
[Reporter]: I want to go back to the question of the [U.S.] surveillance 
ship.  You did mention a number of laws.  Could you clarify what specific 
  
QUESTION: Good, thanks. Secretary Clinton, on the Impeccable, do 
you continue to believe that the U.S. ship was in the right, was in 
international waters, and was harassed by the Chinese vessels? And 
do you think that with your agreement to try to avoid these things in 
the future that the case is now closed, or this is going to be a 
continued irritant in the relationship?  
SECRETARY CLINTON: With respect to the Impeccable, we have 
each stated our positions. But the important point of agreement 
coming out of my discussions with Minister Yang is that we must 
work hard in the future to avoid such incidents, and to avoid this 
particular incident having consequences that are unforeseen. And I 
appreciate the agreement that Minister Yang and I hold on this 
matter. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. Ma, supra note 14. 
 63. Id.  
 64. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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parts of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Chinese laws of the 
sea are concerned so that we can refer to it and see on paper to know what 
you are talking about?  
[Mr. Ma] While answering the questions, I mentioned three laws: UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, and 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Management of 
Foreign-related Marine Scientific Research.  I suggest you go back to do 
some homework, reading these laws carefully, and you will thereby find 
the answer you want.65  
Here again, Mr. Ma implies that the rules of law in UNCLOS are so clear on 
their face, that the reporters will see that the PRC is right on the law merely 
by reading the convention’s text.   
Finally, two days later, the PRC provided a modicum of specificity on its 
legal position.  During the March 12th press conference, Mr. Ma 
emphasized that the Impeccable’s operations on March 8, 2009 were illegal 
because they were conducted without the PRC’s permission.  He stated, 
“The activities of the said [U.S.] ship in China’s exclusive economic zone 
without our permission have broken international laws as well as China’s 
laws and regulations.”66  Moreover, he defended the actions of the PRC 
vessels involved, by stating, “It is totally justified and reasonable for China 
to take actions to safeguard its rights in the sea waters under its jurisdiction 
in accordance with law.”67  Through all of these statements, however, the 
PRC never specified which provision of international law restricted the 
Impeccable’s right to operate in these waters beyond the PRC’s territorial 
seas.  Moreover, the PRC failed to specify which rule of international law 
gave it the authority to require the Impeccable to seek and receive the 
PRC’s permission prior to conducting operations beyond its territorial seas. 
Meanwhile, the PRC Navy also weighed in with its view of how the 
international law of the sea applied to this incident.  On March 10, 2009,  
Xinhua News Agency interviewed Major General Wang Dengping, “a 
lawmaker from the navy,” about the matter while he attended the PRC 
parliament’s annual full session.68  Major General Wang is the political 
commissar of the Armament Department of the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy.69  Regarding the actions of the PRC vessels involved in the March 
  
 65. Ma, supra note 14. 
 66. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 21. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Violation of China’s Sovereignty Never Allowed, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 
10, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/10/content_7564839.htm. 
 69. Id.; see also Cui Xiaohuo, Navy ”Poses No Threats to Others”, CHINA DAILY, 
Mar. 9, 2009, at 1, http://en.ce.cn/National/Politics/200903/09/t20090309_18433802.shtml 
(“Major General Wang Dengping, the political commissar of the navy’s armament 
department who is also a deputy to the legislative session . . . .”). 
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8th incident, Major General Wang told Xinhua, “It is our sovereignty for 
Chinese vessels to conduct activities in the country’s special economic 
zone, and such activities are justified.”70  Regarding the issue of foreign 
military activities, Major General Wang stated, “Innocent passage by naval 
vessels from other countries in the territorial waters in the special economic 
zone is acceptable, but not allowed otherwise.”71  In essence, the Chinese 
Navy’s leadership apparently believes that the PRC vessels involved in the 
March 8th incident was lawfully exercising “sovereignty” over the PRC’s 
EEZ, while the Impeccable only had the right of innocent passage through 
those waters. 
With both nations staking their respective legal claim about this matter 
on the record, let us now examine the legal basis for the Impeccable to 
conduct the operations in these waters—whether the waters are 
characterized as those beyond the PRC’s territorial seas, those within the 
PRC’s exclusive economic zone, or “international waters”—which led to 
the March 8th incident.  To address this question, it is critical to consider 
the development of this area of international law in several stages.  First, 
this requires considering the history predating the UNCLOS.  Then, it 
involves considering the negotiations between nations of the world which 
resulted in the final text of UNCLOS.  Next, it warrants looking at the 
actually terminology of UNCLOS itself.  Finally, it means examining the 
state practice of the overwhelming majority of nations after UNCLOS was 
concluded.  Ultimately, considering these critical facets of the applicable 
law will highlight the law in its actual state—vice as what one nation might 
wish it to be. 
The first point to consider is the legal divisions recognized under the law 
of the sea prior to UNCLOS.  Specifically, as of the early twentieth century, 
there were only two categories of oceans of the world—the territorial seas 
and the high seas.72  Coastal states had sovereignty over their territorial seas, 
while all nations had high seas freedoms beyond those coastal states’ 
territorial seas.73  It is critical to note this bifurcated division of the oceans at 
the outset, because that was the common perspective shared among all 
nations until some coastal states began taking unilateral actions that led to a 
collective response of modifying the regime of legal divisions that was 
ultimately negotiated in UNCLOS. 
The next point to consider is the precise action taken by some of these 
coastal states that spurred the nations of the world to come together and 
negotiate the modified regime of UNCLOS.  Specifically, a trend emerged 
among some developing coastal states, whereby they unilaterally expanded 
  
 70. Violation of China’s Sovereignty Never Allowed, supra note 68. 
 71. Id. 
 72. R. R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 2 (3d ed.  1999). 
 73. Id. at 2. 
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the breadth of their respective territorial seas.74  It is important, however, to 
also identify the specific vested interest or concern at stake among those 
states, because it highlights the limited scope of the accommodation that 
was ultimately bargained in the subsequent negotiations of UNCLOS.  Were 
these developing states claiming additional territorial seas because they 
were concerned with foreign military activities off their coastline?  
Typically, the motivation was to preserve coastal state rights over economic 
resources (i.e., fishing and mineral resources) found in the waters off their 
respective coasts.75  There was not a trend among coastal states to expand 
their territorial sea claims in order to restrict the military activities of other 
nations. 
It is also useful to further consider a third point, which is:  what actually 
unfolded at the negotiations of UNCLOS?  The nations at the bargaining 
table developed and refined a modification to the legal division of the 
oceans of the world which would become known as the exclusive economic 
zone.  The purpose of this modification was clear:  to accommodate those 
coastal states desiring to preserve their economic rights in the waters off 
their respective coasts.76  For activities which had no bearing on these 
economic rights, the nations at the bargaining table agreed to preserve the 
otherwise preexisting regime of high seas freedoms beyond the territorial 
seas of coastal states.  The concept of an exclusive economic zone was not 
intended to reserve any rights for coastal states other than the economic 
rights of the coastal state in those waters, as well as a narrow slice of 
associated jurisdiction for specific purposes, such as protection of the 
environment from major damage.  In fact, a handful of nations that 
attempted to insert a reference to the coastal state’s security interests in the 
“due regard” clause of the exclusive economic zone articles were roundly 
defeated during the negotiations.77  Thus, the regime of high seas freedoms 
  
 74. Roach & Smith, supra note 4, at 110–11 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §511 cmt. n.7) (“In the decades following 
the Second World War, several Latin American states, and later a few African states, 
purported to extend their territorial sea to 200 nautical miles, principally to obtain the 
exclusive right to fish and to regulate fishing in that area.  For some time, major maritime 
powers, including the United States resisted that expansion . . . .”).  
 75. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 73, at 15. 
 76. Id. at 160–61; MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
TRANSMITTING UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
103-39, at 5–6 (1994), available at http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/sea.html [hereinafter 
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSMITTAL] (“The purpose of the EEZ regime is to balance the rights of 
coastal states, such as the United States, to resources (e.g. fisheries and offshore oil and gas) 
and to protect the environment off their coasts with the interests of all States in preserving 
other high seas rights and freedoms.”). 
 77. See generally CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982:  A COMMENTARY VOL. II, at 558–60 (Satya N. 
Nandan et al. eds., 2002). 
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beyond territorial seas which had existed prior to UNCLOS remained 
otherwise fully intact in its final text. 
With that background in mind, let us now turn our focus to the language 
of UNCLOS.  First, consider the name of the zone itself.  It is not called the 
“exclusive security zone” or the “exclusive military zone.”  A famous 
political mantra was coined by James Carville, the skilled strategists for 
former U.S. President Bill Clinton in his successful 1992 election campaign.  
In reminding his campaign staff what issue matters most in American 
presidential campaigns, he put up a large sign in their campaign 
headquarters which said:  “It’s the economy, stupid.”78  Similarly, about the 
limited purpose and scope of the exclusive economic zone, one could 
borrow Carville’s mantra: It’s the economic zone, stupid.79   
Now, let us also consider the provisions of UNCLOS that expressly 
delineate the balance of rights between coastal states and other states in the 
exclusive economic zone.  The key provisions of international law 
governing the exclusive economic zone are found in Articles 56 and 58 of 
UNCLOS.  As the authoritative five-volume UNCLOS Commentaries 
published by the University of Virginia’s Law School noted:  “There is a 
mutuality of relationship of the coastal State and other States, and [A]rticles 
56 and 58 taken together constitute the essence of the regime of the 
exclusive economic zone.”80   
Under Article 58(1) of UNCLOS, all states—including the United 
States—enjoy the high seas freedoms listed elsewhere in convention81 in the 
exclusive economic zones of the world.82  These high seas freedoms include 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine 
cables and pipelines, and “other internationally lawful uses of the seas 
  
 78. JAMES CARVILLE & PAUL BEGALA, BUCK UP, SUCK UP . . . AND COME BACK WHEN 
YOU FOUL UP 115 (2002).   
 79. In some respects, any serious discussion of the exclusive economic zone concept 
is subconsciously diluted when we shorten it to the acronym “EEZ,” thereby hiding the 
“economic” focus of the term. 
 80. CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 78, at 556. 
 81. UNCLOS, supra note 48, art. 87. 
 82. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSMITTAL, supra note 77, at 24. 
Pursuant to Article 58, in the EEZ all States enjoy the high seas 
freedoms of navigation and overflight, laying of submarine cables 
and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the seas 
related to those freedoms, such as those associated with the operation 
of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and which are 
compatible with the other provisions of the Convention.  Article 88 
to 115, which (apart from the fuller enumeration of freedoms in 
Article 87) set forth the entire regime of the high seas on matters 
other than fisheries, apply to the EEZ in so far as they are not 
incompatible with Part V.  These rights are the same as the rights 
recognized by international law for all States on the high seas. 
Id. 
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related to those freedoms.”83  How do nations determine what constitutes 
“other internationally lawful uses of the seas?”  The text of UNCLOS does 
not provide more specific guidance.  Therefore, we must turn to the custom 
and practice of nations through history—vice merely what the PRC has 
unilaterally decided in the past few years.  For centuries, nations have 
enjoyed high seas freedoms—to include collecting intelligence and 
conducting surveillance—beyond the territorial seas of coastal states.84  In 
the decades since UNCLOS was negotiated, naval forces of the world have 
continued to conduct military operations, exercises, and activities—
including collecting intelligence and conducting surveillance—as 
internationally lawful uses of the sea in the exclusive economic zones 
throughout the world.   
Moreover, the state practice of the overwhelming majority of nations 
during the past three decades reflects that coastal states lack the authority to 
restrict foreign military activities within their respective EEZs.  In fact, of 
the 192 member-states of the United Nations, only approximately fifteen 
nations purport to regulate or prohibit foreign military activities in an EEZ. 
Those countries are:  Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cape Verde, China, India, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Portugal, and Uruguay. 85  Of course, it should be pointed out that the 
United States has protested and/or conducted operational challenges against 
all of those claims.86  In addition, two other states (Peru and Ecuador) 
unlawfully claim a 200 nautical mile territorial sea, in which they purport to 
regulate and restrict foreign military activities.  Few of these nations other 
than the PRC have operationally interfered with U.S. military activities 
within the EEZ or claimed 200 nautical mile territorial seas.  In short, the 
  
 83. UNCLOS, supra note 48, art. 58(1). 
 84. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSMITTAL, supra note 77, at 24 (“Military activities, such as 
anchoring, launching and landing of aircraft, operating military devices, intelligence 
collection, exercises, operations and conducting military surveys are recognized historic high 
seas uses that are preserved by Article 58.”). 
At the same time, all States continue to enjoy in the zone traditional 
high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses 
of the sea related to these freedoms, which remain qualitatively and 
quantitatively the same as those freedoms when exercises seaward of 
the zone.  Military operations, exercises and activities have always 
been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea. The right to 
conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States in 
the exclusive economic zone.  This is the import of article 58 of the 
Convention. 
Roach & Smith, supra note 4, at 242 (quoting the World Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.52/WS/37 (Dec. 10, 1982)). 
 85. See Maritime Claims Reference Manual, Department of Defense 2005.1-M, 
Under Sec’y of Def. for Policy (June 23, 2005). 
 86. Id.   
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PRC’s legal position about the Impeccable’s operations in its EEZ is an 
extreme minority view among the community of nations.  
While the navigational rights identified in Article 58(1) are not absolute 
or unlimited, the text of UNCLOS clearly sets out only one set of 
limitations on those rights.  Specifically, in that same Article 58 of 
UNCLOS, paragraph 3 states that the user states exercising these 
navigational rights shall have “due regard to the rights and duties of the 
coastal state.”87  What coastal state rights and duties does Article 58(3) have 
in mind?  Are the coastal state’s rights absolute and unlimited in the 
exclusive economic zone?  No, they are not.  Rather, they are the “sovereign 
rights” and “jurisdiction” which the coastal state enjoys over the EEZ, 
expressly delineated in Article 56 of UNCLOS.88  Specifically, a coastal 
state like the PRC possesses sovereign rights in its EEZ only with respect to 
living and non-living natural resources (conservation, management, 
exploration, and exploitation) as well as economic exploitation and 
exploration (such as using water, winds and currents for energy production).  
A coastal state also has “jurisdiction” in the EEZ (as opposed to sovereign 
rights) with respect to scientific research, man-made structures, and 
protecting the marine environment.   
What is most telling is Article 56’s deliberate use of the term “sovereign 
rights,” vice sovereignty.89  Coastal states do not have sovereignty over their 
EEZs.90  Put another way:  Article 56 does not give the coastal state the 
right to limit high seas freedoms of other States beyond the coastal state’s 
territorial seas.91  None of those sovereign rights or jurisdiction includes the 
  
 87. UNCLOS, supra note 48, art. 58(3). 
 88. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSMITTAL, supra note 77, at 24 (“Article 56 enumerates the 
rights of the coastal State in the EEZ.”). 
 89. UNCLOS, supra note 48, art. 56. 
 90. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSMITTAL, supra note 77, 6 (“The coastal state does not have 
sovereignty over the EEZ . . . .”).   
The terms `sovereign rights’ and `jurisdiction’ are used to denote 
functional rights over these matters and do not imply sovereignty.  A 
claim of sovereignty in the EEZ would be contradicted by the 
language of Articles 55 and 56 and precluded by Article 58 and the 
provisions it incorporates by reference. 
Id. at 24.   Roach & Smith, supra note 4, at 113 (quoting the World Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.52/WS/37 (Dec. 10, 1982)) (“In this zone beyond its territory 
and territorial sea, a coastal State may assert sovereign rights over natural resources and 
related jurisdiction, but may not claim or exercise sovereignty.  The extent of coastal State 
authority is carefully defined in the Convention adopted by the Conference.”); Roach & 
Smith, supra note 4, at 114 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)  FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES §514 cmt C) (“The coastal state does not have sovereignty over the exclusive 
economic zone but only `sovereign rights’ for a specific purpose—the management of 
natural resources and other economic activities.”). 
 91. UNCLOS, supra note 48, art. 56. 
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authority to restrict military activities.92  Moreover, it is the duty of the flag 
state, not the right of the coastal state to enforce due regard obligations to 
coastal state resources and other rights.93  Therefore, the PRC’s attempts to 
restrict military surveillance activities of the Impeccable on March 8, 2009 
exceeded the scope of the PRC’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction afforded 
to it as a coastal state under Article 56 of UNCLOS.94  
CONCLUSION:  CAUSE FOR CONCERN 
When considering the Impeccable incident from a U.S. perspective, we 
must be reasonable and actually “keep perspective” on the incident.  That is, 
the incident should first be assessed in light of other international incidents 
involving a single platform of U.S. Navy forces.  For example, the 
Impeccable incident clearly did not rise to the level of the attack on the USS 
Cole,95 a precursor to 9/11 and the resulting Global War on Terror; nor did 
the incident equate to the attack on the USS Maine,96 a suspected hostile act 
  
 92. Of course, a law school hypothetical could be envisioned in which a military 
vessel must not engage in economic activities like fishing or extracting mineral resources.  
However, as for the actual operations conducted by the Impeccable on March 8, 2009, it will 
come as no surprise to the reader that the master of Impeccable was not named Captain Ahab 
and the Impeccable’s towed array was not a rod and reel designed to catch Moby Dick in the 
South China Sea. 
 93. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSMITTAL, supra note 77, at 24. 
 94. Id. at 25.  
While no State has claimed an EEZ extending beyond 200 miles 
from coastal baselines, several of the States which have declared 
EEZs claim rights to regulate activities within the EEZ well beyond 
those authorized in the Convention.  For example, Iran claims the 
right to prohibit all foreign military activities within its EEZ.  The 
United States does not recognize such claims, which are not within 
the competence of coastal States under the Convention. 
Id. 
 95. See Commanding Officer USS Cole, History: USS Cole (DDG 67), 
http://www.cole.navy.mil/site%20pages/history.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).  In 2000, the 
destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) deployed to the Mediterranean and Red Seas as part of the 
George Washington Battle Group.  Id.  On October 12, 2000, the Cole was refueling in Aden 
Harbor, Yemen.  Id.  A small boat with explosives on board approached the Cole and 
attacked its port mid-ships.  Id.  The terrorist attack resulted in the death of seventeen 
crewmembers and injury to thirty-nine others, and blasted a 40-foot by 60-foot hole in the 
ship.  Id. 
 96. See Naval History & Heritage Command, The Destruction of the USS Maine, 
Aug. 13, 2003, http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq71-1.htm.  On the evening of February 
15, 1898, an explosion occurred aboard the battleship USS Maine while anchored in the 
harbor of Havana, Cuba.  Id.  The explosion killed 266 crewmembers and sunk the battle 
ship in Havana harbor.  In the weeks thereafter, the U.S. Navy convened a board of inquiry 
which was inclusive in the determining the cause of the explosion.  Id.  In 1911, the Navy 
convened a second board of inquiry into the matter.   Id. Finding that the bottom hull plates 
in the area of the reserve six-inch magazine were bent inward and back, the second board of 
inquiry concluded that a mine had detonated under the magazine, causing the explosion that 
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which led to Spanish-American War.  It also did not rise to the level of the 
USS Maddox incident,97 which resulted in the “Gulf of Tonkin” Resolution 
by Congress that authorized President Johnson to escalate the United States 
military’s involvement in Vietnam.  Unlike the North Korean unlawful 
capture of the USS Pueblo98 conducting surveillance operations beyond its 
  
destroyed the ship.  Id.  In 1976, Admiral Hyman Rickover, U.S. Navy, published a book 
How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed, in which he concluded that the damage caused to 
the ship was inconsistent with an external explosion.  Id.  Instead, Rickover opined that the 
explosion was caused by a spontaneous combustion of coal in the bunker next to the 
magazine.  Id.  A definitive explanation for the destruction of the Maine remains “elusive.”  
Nonetheless, the destruction of the Maine served as a catalyst for the eventual U.S. 
declaration of war on Spain on April 23, 1898.  Id.    
 97. Naval History & Heritage Command, USS Maddox (DD-731), 
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-m/dd731-k.htm (last visited March 28, 
2010).  
Amid steadily rising tensions over North Vietnam’s activities in Laos 
and South Vietnam, at the end of July 1964 USS Maddox entered the 
Gulf of Tonkin for a cruise along the North Vietnamese coast.  As 
part of a general U.S. effort to collect intelligence in potential Far 
Eastern hot spots, this ‘Desoto Patrol’ was particularly focused on 
obtaining information that would support South Vietnamese coastal 
raids against North Vietnam.  One of these had just taken place as 
Maddox began her mission.  On the afternoon of 2 August 1964, 
while steaming well offshore in international waters, Maddox was 
attacked by three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats.  The 
destroyer maneuvered to avoid torpedoes and used her guns against 
her fast-moving opponents, hitting them all.  In turn, she was struck 
in the after gun director by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun 
bullet. Maddox called for air support from the carrier Ticonderoga, 
whose planes strafed the three boats, leaving one dead in the water 
and burning.  Both sides then separated.  Maddox was soon ordered 
to resume her patrol, this time accompanied by the larger and newer 
destroyer Turner Joy.  On 3 August, the South Vietnamese 
conducted another coastal raid. Intelligence indicated that the North 
Vietnamese were planning to again attack the U.S. ships operating 
off their shores, although this interpretation was incorrect.  During 
the night of 4 August, while they were underway in the middle of the 
Tonkin Gulf, Maddox and Turner Joy detected speedy craft closing 
in.  For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and 
maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of 
torpedoes.  Though information obtained well after the fact indicates 
that there was actually no North Vietnamese attack that night, U.S. 
authorities were convinced at the time that one had taken place, and 
reacted by sending planes from the carriers Ticonderoga and 
Constellation to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel 
facilities.  A few days later, the U.S. Congress passed the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution, which gave the Government authorization for what 
eventually became a full-scale war in Southeast Asia. 
Id. 
 98. See Naval History & Heritage Command, USS Pueblo (AGER-2), 
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-p/ager2.htm (last visited March 28, 2010).  
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territorial seas, 99 the PRC wisely did not breach the sovereign immune 
status of the Impeccable recognized under international law.  Moreover, the 
PRC did not erroneously use force in this incident, as was done by Iraqi 
forces against the USS Stark100 and Israeli forces against the USS Liberty.101  
In short, the Impeccable incident thankfully did not start a war or lead to an 
unnecessary use of force resulting in injury or loss of life.  Nonetheless, 
what happened on March 8, 2009—particularly, the actions of the PRC—
still raises substantial concerns, including concerns for the United States, 
concerns for the PRC's neighbors in the region, and concerns for all nations 
of the world (outside of the PRC, of course). 
  
In January 1968, USS Pueblo (AGER-2) was conducting electronic intelligence collection 
and other duties.  Id.  On January 23, 1968, North Korean forces attacked the Pueblo while it 
was conducting lawful operations beyond the territorial seas of North Korea.  Id.  During the 
attack, North Korean forces killed one crewmember and took the other eighty-two 
crewmembers as prisoner.  Id.  The North Koreans held the crewmembers captive for eleven 
months, finally repatriating them on December 23, 1968.  Id.  To date, the North Koreans 
have retained the Pueblo and have opened it as a museum its capital Pyongyang, even though 
the ship remains the property of the U.S. Navy.  Id.   
 99. See Naval History & Heritage Command, USS Pueblo (AGER-2), 
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-p/ager2.htm (last visited March 28, 2010).  
In January 1968, USS Pueblo (AGER-2) was conducting electronic intelligence collection 
and other duties.  Id.  On January 23, 1968, North Korean forces attacked the Pueblo while it 
was conducting lawful operations beyond the territorial seas of North Korea.  Id.  During the 
attack, North Korean forces killed one crewmember and took the other eighty-two 
crewmembers as prisoner.  Id.  The North Koreans held the crewmembers captive for eleven 
months, finally repatriating them on December 23, 1968.  Id.  To date, the North Koreans 
have retained the Pueblo and have opened it as a museum its capital Pyongyang, even though 
the ship remains the property of the U.S. Navy.  Id.   
 100. See generally Damage Control Museum, Naval Sea Systems Command, USS 
Stark, http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/museum/STARK/Stark3.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 
2010).  In May 1987, during the Tanker War between Iraq and Iran, the frigate USS Stark 
(FFG 31) was conducting operations in the international waters of the central Persian Gulf.  
On May 17, 1987, a single Iraqi F-1 Mirage fighter fired two Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles 
at the Stark, apparently mistaking the frigate for an oil tanker en route to a port of call in 
Iran.  Id.  Both missiles hit the Stark—killing thirty-seven crewmembers, injuring five more, 
and causing significant damage to the ship.  Id.  The attack was unprovoked and 
indiscriminate.  Id.  The Stark never fired a weapon nor employed any countermeasures, 
either in self-defense or in retaliation.  Id.  
 101. See Naval History & Heritage Command, USS Liberty (AGTR-5) 1964–1970, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-l/agtr5.htm (last visited March 28, 2010).  
In June 1967, during the “Six-Day War” between Israel and several Arab nations, USS 
Liberty (AGTR-5) was collecting electronic intelligence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.  
Id.  On June 8, 1967, the Liberty was conducting operations in international waters off the 
Sinai Peninsula.  Id.  Although the Liberty was clearly marked as a U.S. Navy ship, an Israeli 
military aircraft attacked the Liberty with gunfire, rockets, and bombs.  Id. Thereafter, three 
Israeli Navy motor torpedo boats continued the attack.  Id.  Israel subsequently apologized 
for the incident, explaining that its air and naval force had mistaken the Liberty for a much 
smaller Egyptian Navy ship.  Id.  The attack killed thirty-four crewmembers, injured 170 
others, and resulted in substantial damage to the ship.  Id.  
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First, the PRC's actions in the March 8th incident generated significant 
safety concerns for the United States of what could have easily happened—
as demonstrated by the tragic results of another historical confrontation.  
Instead of the Maine, the Maddux, the Pueblo, the Stark or the Liberty, the 
incident that is most similar to the Impeccable incident of March 2009 is—
no surprise—a previous incident between U.S. and PRC forces.  
Specifically, despite the difference in air versus maritime platforms, there 
are haunting similarities between the Impeccable incident and the April 
2001 incident between a U.S. Navy EP-3 and a PLA F-8.102  In both 
situations, the platforms were not armed with lethal munitions.  In both 
situations, the PRC platforms involved were engaged in behavior that 
violated international safety norms and created substantial risk to 
themselves as well as the U.S. forces involved. 
In the April 2001 incident, the PLA pilot’s aggressive actions directly 
resulted in an accidental collision leading to his own death and jeopardized 
the lives of the U.S. Navy crew.103  Fortunately, the difference between 
these two incidents is that in the Impeccable incident, no collision occurred 
and no personnel on either side were killed or injured—mostly due to the 
skilled control of the Impeccable by its master and crew.  The reality to 
consider, however, is that the March 2009 confrontation created by the five 
PRC vessels could have easily led to different, more tragic results. 
  
 102. See CRS report RL30946, supra note 3.  On April 1, 2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3E 
turboprop reconnaissance aircraft was conducting  a routine, overt reconnaissance mission in 
international airspace off the coast of the PRC.  Id.  Shortly after 9:00 am, the EP-3 and a 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) F-8II jet fighter accidentally collided in 
international airspace about seventy miles of the PRC’s Hainan island.  Id.  After the 
collision, the U.S. crew made an emergency landing of their damaged plane on the island at 
the PLAN’s Lingshui airfield, and the PRC subsequently detained the twenty-four crew 
members for 11 days.  Id.  The PLAN’s F-8 fighter crashed into the sea and the pilot was 
lost.  Id.   
 103. Id.  at 14.   
U.S. officials believe that while the immediate cause of the collision 
was an accidental contact made by the F-8 fighter, the collision was 
also precipitated by increased aggressiveness in the PLA’s 
interceptions of U.S. aircraft in international airspace.  According to 
the Pentagon, the PLA began its recent pattern of aggressive 
interceptions of U.S. reconnaissance flights in December 2000.  At 
his news conference on April 13, 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld revealed 
that, since December, there were 44 PLA interceptions of U.S. 
reconnaissance flights off the coast of China, with six coming within 
30 feet, and two within 10 feet, occurring on December 17 and 19, 
2000, January 24 and 30, 2001, March 21 and April 1.  He also 
reported that the United States lodged a formal protest about the 
aggressive and dangerous interceptions on December 28, 2000.  He 
showed a video taken aboard one of the U.S. reconnaissance planes 
on January 24 showing a F-8 flying very close. 
Id. 
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Likewise, the 2001 aerial incident and the Impeccable incident also share 
a common link about the intended role of these forces and the responsibility 
of the chain of command.  Traditionally, commanders of ground forces 
presumed that the actions of one junior enlisted soldier or Marine could 
only have minimal impact on the mission success of an entire force or 
military.  Through time, however, the potential impact by individual service 
members has increased.  Among U.S. ground forces, commanders have 
gradually come to recognize the role of the “Strategic Corporal.”104  Due in 
part to the rise of the information age in modern military operations, U.S. 
military commanders now realize that a single soldier or a small group of 
soldiers are fully capable of negatively impacting a force’s mission in a 
substantial way.  Anyone who disputes the concept of the “Strategic 
Corporal” only need consider, for example, the strategic setback in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom caused by a handful of soldiers mistreating enemy 
detainees in Abu Ghraib prison.105   
  
 104. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block 
War, MARINES MAGAZINE, Jan. 1999, at 33, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ 
awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm. 
The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other recent operations, 
whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional 
warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made by 
small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level. The 
Corps is, by design, a relatively young force. Success or failure will 
rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability to make the 
right decision at the right time at the point of contact. As with 
Corporal Hernandez at CP Charlie, today’s Marines will often 
operate far “from the flagpole” without the direct supervision of 
senior leadership. And, like Corporal Hernandez, they will be asked 
to deal with a bewildering array of challenges and threats. In order to 
succeed under such demanding conditions they will require 
unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of character. Most 
importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make 
well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress—
decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the 
media and the court of public opinion. In many cases, the individual 
Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign 
policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical 
situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, 
therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; 
and he will become, as the title of this article suggests—the Strategic 
Corporal. 
Id. at 33. 
 105. See Tom Regan, Six Morons Who Lost The War, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 
4, 2004, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 6, 2004, page H2674, available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2004-05-06/pdf/CREC-2004-05-06-pt1-PgH2666.pdf.  
Regardless of the outcome of the now multiple investigations into 
prisoner abuse at Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison, politicians and 
media around the world say the United States’ image has suffered a 
serious blow. Sen. Joe Biden (D) of Delaware said on Fox News 
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In the maritime context, the U.S. military fully recognizes what it has 
tasked its forces to do in the South China Sea and has trained them and 
provided clear commander’s guidance accordingly.  The question must be 
asked:  Does the PRC have the same appreciation for the situation?  
Apparently not, as indicated by the PRC vessels’ long “leash” resulting in 
the reckless and embarrassing conduct by the five vessels involved in the 
incident.  Thus, the U.S. government remains concerned that the PRC 
unwisely delegated the authority to dictate international law and establish 
national policy to a “Strategic Seaman.”106 
Second, the PRC's actions in the March 8th incident should have also 
caused concern among nations other than the United States—especially 
among the PRC's neighbors in the South China Sea and East China Sea.  
First and foremost, these nations should be concerned whether the PRC has 
decided to abandon its legal obligations and political commitments to 
resolve maritime disputes by peaceful means.  It is worth highlighting that 
the US-PRC dispute over the PRC's excessive maritime claim over 
purportedly restricting its EEZ is not the only international dispute 
involving PRC actions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.  Of 
note, nearly all of the PRC's neighbors in the region have competing 
territorial claims with the PRC regarding the outlying islands, continental 
shelf, and EEZ demarcation lines in those waters.  As a party to UNCLOS,  
  
Sunday that ‘This is the single most significant undermining act that’s 
occurred in a decade in that region of the world in terms of our 
standing.’ The Associated Press reports that a senior Bush 
administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the 
photos (of U.S. soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners) hurt the U.S. efforts 
to win over an audience that is already deeply skeptical of U.S. 
intentions. Arabs and Muslims, the official added, ‘are certain to 
seize upon the images as proof that the American occupiers are as 
brutal as ousted President Saddam Hussein’s government.’  
Officials at the Defense Department are also said to be ‘livid,’ and 
well aware of the damage that has been done by the incident, 
according to NBC News’ Pentagon reporter Jim Miklaszewski. 
Speaking on the Imus in the Morning radio/MSNBC program 
Tuesday, Mr. Miklaszewski said he asked a Pentagon contact about 
the soldiers alleged to be involved, to which the Pentagon official 
replied, ‘You mean the six morons who lost the war?’ 
Id.  See also Neil MacKay, The Pictures That Lost The War, SUNDAY HERALD, May 2, 2004, 
available at  http://www.heraldscotland.com/the-pictures-that-lost-the-war-1.829223. 
 106. John Pomfret, U.S. Hopes to Strengthen Ties with China’s Expanding Military, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/10/14/AR2009101403715.html (“Both confrontations [of U.S. Navy 
surveillance ships in March and May 2009 by PRC vessels] ended peacefully when the U.S. 
ships made it clear that they would leave; but the incidents highlighted ‘the risk,’ a senior 
Pentagon official said recently, ‘of having the entire bilateral relationship unravel based on 
the decision-making of 18-year-old seamen.’”). 
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the PRC has an obligation to resolve such competing territorial claims 
“by peaceful means.”107  As a party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC), the PRC has an obligation to resolve international disputes in the 
Southeast Asian region—including territorial disputes with Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations—without the “threat or use of 
force” and through “friendly negotiations.”108  Pursuant to that TAC 
obligation, the PRC made a political commitment in 2002 with the ASEAN 
nations to resolve these disputes “without resorting to threat or use of 
force,” “by peaceful means,” and “through friendly consultations and 
negotiations.”109  Yet some governments and international law of the sea 
experts in the Southeast Asian region have begun to question whether the 
PRC is truly committed to the 2002 Declaration, and instead “desire[s] for 
control of the South China Sea.”110  The question must be considered: does 
the PRC's aggressive actions in the March 8th incident also signal a 
deliberate abandonment by the PRC of those legal obligations and political 
commitments? 
The unfortunate answer to that question is that nations of the world—
especially the PRC’s neighbors in the South China Sea and East China 
Sea—should be concerned that the PRC's actions in the March 8th incident 
  
 107. UNCLOS, Art. 279 (“Article 279 Obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means 
States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, 
of the Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a solution by the means 
indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.”) 
 108. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, Feb. 24, 1976, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm, Art. 13. 
The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good 
faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters 
directly affecting them should arise, especially disputes likely to 
disturb regional peace and harmony, they shall refrain from the threat 
or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among 
themselves through friendly negotiations. 
While the initial membership to TAC was limited to Southeast Asian nations, the PRC and 
other nations subsequently joined the TAC. 
 109. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Nations and the PRC, 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Nov. 4, 2002, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm, Art. 4. 
The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and 
jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the 
threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations 
by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with 
universally recognized principles of international law, including the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
 110. Nguyen Hong Thao and Ramses Amer, A New Legal Arrangement for the South 
China Sea?, 40 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW, November 11, 2009,  333, 
339, available at http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/ 
00908320903077209. 
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could be part of a greater anti-access strategy of the PRC.  One year after 
the Impeccable incident, during testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed 
Services Committee, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command discussed a 
“particular concern” to the United States that should also alarm other  
nations in the region as well.111  Specifically, Admiral Willard stated that the 
PRC's “evolving military capabilities . . . appear designed to challenge U.S. 
freedom of action in the region or exercise aggression or coercion of its 
neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and partners.”  While he was 
speaking specifically of the PRC's military capabilities, he could have easily 
been speaking of the PRC’s apparent anti-access strategy driving those 
evolving capabilities, as well as the objective manifestation of that anti-
access strategy in events like March 8th incident. 
Third, the nations of the world should be concerned that the PRC's 
actions in the March 8th incident reflect an effort by the PRC government to 
unilaterally renegotiate a widely-accepted body of international law.  This is 
a concern for all nations, and not merely the United States or the PRC's 
neighbors in the South China Sea and East China Sea.  As discussed in this 
Article, the text and negotiating history of the applicable law undermine the 
PRC's position.  Despite a clear history of the UNCLOS parties rejecting an 
attempt by a few nations to insert security interests into the scope of the 
EEZ restrictions, the international community is witnessing an ongoing 
effort by the PRC, in essence, to engage in classic PRC-style negotiating 
behavior and tactics, as it attempts to renegotiate the grand bargain reached 
by the nations of the world in the conclusion of UNCLOS. 
This is not a hollow allegation, but rather an assessment based upon 
observations about the PRC words and deeds—including its words and 
actions surrounding the March 8th incident—that look alot like typical 
PRC-style negotiating behavior.  For example, the PRC government has 
been caught acting contradictory112 on multiple occasions with its purported 
legal position that foreign military operations in another nation's EEZ are 
restricted.  Most notably, on June 11, 2009— only three months after the 
  
 111. Admiral Robert Willard, Testimony, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 
March 26, 2010, available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03% 
20March/Willard%2003-26-10.pdf.  
 112. Professor James Sebinius, an expert on negotiation theory at the Harvard 
Business School, recently examined the Chinese negotiating culture.  In discussing the 
relation between the PRC’s governance philosophy and negotiating culture, he wrote:    
Contradictions and ambiguities are interpreted in a way that achieves 
the immediate policy objectives of the party and the government.  
The experimental nature of reform in China, moreover, renders laws 
subject to constant change, characterized by Deng Xiaoping as 
‘crossing the river by feeling the stones underfoot.’  
James K. Sebenius & Cheng Qian, Cultural Notes on Chinese Negotiating Behavior 7 
(Harvard Business School Working Paper 09-076), available at http://www.hbs.edu/ 
research/pdf/09-076.pdf.  
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March 8th incident—a PRC submarine hit an underwater towed array of the 
destroyer USS John McCain “near Subic Bay off the coast of the 
Philippines.”113  Similarly, the PRC's public statements immediately 
following the March 8th incident were deliberately ambiguous114 in 
pinpointing which specific provisions of UNCLOS purportedly restricted 
the Impeccable's right to operate in these waters beyond the PRC's territorial 
seas or gave the PRC the authority to require Impeccable to seek and 
receive its permission prior to conducting such operations.115  
In light of the above assessment that the PRC is engaging in various 
methods of traditional PRC negotiating behavior, the reader might wonder:  
So what?  Should other nations be concerned with such political bargaining 
by the PRC?  The answer is:  yes, all nations should be concerned because it 
puts the entire UNCLOS regime in jeopardy.  UNCLOS, which took nearly 
a decade to negotiate, is signed and ratified by 159 of the 192 nations of the 
world.  Many of the very points about the EEZ which the PRC raises now 
were addressed at the negotiating conferences.  The juridical features of the 
new EEZ concept were debated by the nations convened, and the 
Conference of state-parties ultimately rejected those proposals at the 
bargaining table that proposed granting some type of security interest to the 
coastal state in the EEZ.  Thus, the PRC had their chance at the bargaining 
table, but the majority view prevailed and the PRC position was rejected. 
More importantly, UNCLOS reflects a grand bargain between all of the 
states who had a seat at the bargaining table during those ten plus years of 
negotiations—including the United States and the PRC, but also so many 
more states.  Some of these states were coastal states, some were maritime 
states, and some had interests from both perspectives.  The final terms of 
UNCLOS reflect a “proper, long-term balance between coastal interests and 
maritime interests.”116  Ironically, unlike the “unequal treaty” era which 
continues to sting in the psyche of Chinese history,117 the agreement reached 
  
 113. Sub Collides With Sonar Array Towed By US Navy Ship, CNN, June 12, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/US/06/12/china.submarine/index.html. The PRC Government 
subsequently confirmed that the incident occurred, but provided no further details.  China: 
US Destroyer’s Sonar Hit Submarine, MSNBC, June 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31382800.  The U.S. Navy sources told the media that it did 
not believe the collision was deliberately caused by the PRC submarine, as it would have 
been extremely dangerous had the array gotten caught in the submarine’s propellers.  Id.  
Beyond that, neither the PRC nor the U.S. government side made any additional comments 
on the matter.   
 114. Sebenius & Oian, supra note 112. 
 115. See footnotes 63-67 supra and accompanying text. 
 116. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSMITTAL, supra note 77, at 23. 
From the perspective of the United States, Part V (articles 55-75) 
provides a regime for the EEZ that achieves a proper, long-term 
balance between coastal interests and maritime interests.  The 
provisions enable the coastal state to explore, exploit, conserve, and 
manage resources out to 200 miles from coastal baselines, while 
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 in UNCLOS was not a forced deal between unequal nations, but rather a 
bargain among nations based on equality.  If the PRC did not like the final 
terms of UNCLOS as agreed by the parties, then it could have chosen not to 
sign it; however, it voluntarily chose to do so.  The international community 
must insist that it is too late in the game for the PRC to develop buyer’s 
remorse on UNCLOS.  China should then either comply with the treaty, or 
withdraw from the framework altogether. 
It is also important to note that UNCLOS was intentionally structured as 
a “package”118 deal where nations were not allowed to selectively adopt  
  
allowing other States to navigate, overfly, and conduct related 
activities in the EEZ. 
Id. 
 117. MARGARET MACMILLAN, NIXON AND MAO: THE WEEK THAT CHANGED THE 
WORLD 31 (2007))  (“By 1872, . . . to add to China’s misery, foreigners, greedy, demanding, 
unreasonable, and regrettably powerful, were tying a weak Chinese government up with a 
series of treaties, remembered to this day by the Chinese as the ‘unequal treaties.’  Chinese 
territory and Chinese independence were slowly being sliced away.”).  
Chinese efforts to preserve its isolation formally ended in August 
1842 when China signed the first of what became known in China as 
the ‘unequal treaties.’  The Treaty of Nanjing allowed Western 
traders to begin carving out their first pieces of China.  Hong Kong 
was ceded to Britain.  Five Chinese ports – Canton (now Guan-
zhou), Amoy (Xiamen), Foochow (Fuzhou), Ningpo (Ningbo), and 
Shanghai – were opened to foreign residents and trade.  A year later, 
Britain forced China to sign another treaty promising ‘most favored 
nation’ status so that if any other country got better trade concessions 
from China, Britain would automatically receive the same treatment.  
A year after that, the Americans forced China to grant American 
residents (and eventually all foreigners) extraterritoriality, giving 
them immunity from prosecution in Chinese courts . . . .  
[F]oreigners doing business in China must understand that there’s 
nothing ancient about the last two hundred years and the humiliations 
they have held for the Chinese.  They believe that foreigners strong-
armed their way into China in the past two hundred years in order to 
plunder the country’s wealth is deeply engrained in the Chinese 
psyche.  They are taught from childhood that China was the world’s 
mightiest empire, the best at everything, until the foreigners came 
knocking at the end of the eighteenth century to ruthlessly exploit a 
people who had done them no harm. 
MCGREGOR, supra note 42, at 23–26. 
 118. Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, A Constitution for the Oceans, Dec. 1982, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf.  
The second theme which emerged from the statements [of delegates] 
is that the provisions of the Convention are closely interrelated and 
form an integral package.  Thus it is not possible for a State to pick 
what it likes and to disregard what it does not like.  It was also said 
that rights and obligations go hand in hand and it is not permissible 
to claim rights under the Convention without being willing to 
shoulder the corresponding obligations. 
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certain provisions, while disregarding others.  If the PRC was concerned 
about the nature of the EEZ, it would have been barred under the treaty 
from reserving that position.  In fact, however, Beijing did not even submit 
an understanding at the time of ratification on the issue, as a handful of 
other states have done.  Regardless, the nations of the world should not  
allow the PRC to selectively honor certain provisions of UNCLOS to its 
benefit, while disregarding other provisions that benefit other nations.  
Otherwise, that effectively permits the PRC to renegotiate the treaty without 
ever returning to the multilateral bargaining table, thereby subverting this 
entire regime of international law. 
In examining the factual accounts and legal arguments posited by the 
U.S. and PRC governments regarding the March 8th incident, this Article 
has reached several conclusions.  First, the U.S. government was candid, 
clear, and consistent in its factual account of the March 8th incident and 
provided detailed corroboration to the international community; the PRC 
government, on the other hand, was cryptic at best, and misleading at worst.  
Of note, the statements of fact made by the U.S. government were not 
“sheer lies,” as alleged by a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman; instead, they 
are true “lies,” as corroborated by multiple photos and video clips of the 
incident.  Second, the operations and actions of the Impeccable on March 8, 
2009 were wholly consistent with its rights and responsibilities afforded by 
applicable international law; the PRC government and PRC-flagged vessels 
involved, on the other hand, demonstrated utter disregard for those same 
bodies of law. 
In short, neither the facts of the incident nor the applicable law supported 
the PRC’s actions and position—both in the specific incident of March 8th 
or in this EEZ dispute generally.  Consequently, the PRC's actions in the 
March 8th incident and in the EEZ dispute generally are a matter of concern 
to the United States, and should be a matter of concern to all nations. 
As stated at the outset, this Article was intended to provide a detailed 
perspective from the United States on the March 8th incident.  While it has 
highlighted official press statements by the PRC government and cited 
general legal arguments made by observers within the PRC which predate 
the March 8th incident, the international law and foreign affairs 
communities lack an equivalent detailed perspective on the March 8th 
incident from the PRC vantage point.  Questions—both factual and legal—
remain, many of which have been specifically identified in this Article.  In 
the interest of transparency and mutual trust, a legal expert within the PRC 
should summon the intellectual courage to provide such a detailed 
perspective.  Otherwise—to return one final time to the courtroom 
analogy—the PRC risks failing to appear in the courtroom of international 
public opinion and thereby losing the Impeccable case by a default 
judgment. 
 
